Upcoming events: Protecting children from unhealthy food marketing – learning from the past, ideas for the future

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Along with Cancer Council NSW and the Charles Perkins Centre’s Food Governance Node, Sydney Health Law is hosting an event on regulation of unhealthy food marketing to children.

Protecting children from unhealthy food marketing remains a hot topic, given increasing concern about children’s diet-related health.

In Australia, food marketing to children is regulated largely through two voluntary food industry initiatives. In the lead up to the 10th anniversary of these initiatives, this event will examine their success in improving the food marketing environment, along with the recent ACCC v Heinz decision and developments in food advertising regulation at a state level.

Details for the event are as follows, and you can register to attend here.

Date: Wednesday 7th November

Time: 6-8pm (canapés from 5.30pm)

Venue: Law Foyer, Level 2, Sydney Law School 

Speakers:

  • Research on food marketing and children’s health – the state of play: Associate Professor Bridget Kelly, University of Wollongong
  • Consumer law and food marketing in ACC v Heinz: Adrian Coorey ACCC, and Jane Martin, Obesity Policy Coalition
  • The food industry’s initiatives on marketing to children: Geoffrey Annison, Australian Food and Grocery Council, and Jane Martin, Obesity Policy Coalition
  • State government regulation of food advertising on transport infrastructure: Wendy Watson, Cancer Council NSW, and Emily Harper, ACT Health

Some recent cases on s 5O of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW)

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Image: Matt Madd, Flickr

Section 5O of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) (CLA) introduced a modified version of the Bolam principle into the law of civil liability in NSW, extended to professionals other than medical professionals (the original subject of the principle). The effect of s 5O(1) is that a court is prevented from making a finding of negligence against a defendant professional where it can be shown that he or she acted in accordance with a practice widely accepted as being competent by peer professional opinion, unless that opinion is irrational (s 5O(2)) (s 5P excludes the application of s 5O to risk warnings in certain circumstances). Three recent cases involving s 5O provide some guidance on how the provision should be interpreted.

“A practice”

In Sparks v Hobson [2018] NSWCA 29 (recently covered on this blog by Professor Roger Magnusson) the plaintiff, Mr Hobson, required corrective surgery to straighten his spine, which took place in two stages. The first stage proceeded without incident, but the second stage had to be brought ahead of schedule and done urgently. The surgery was terminated after the anesthetist, Dr Sparks, became concerned that Mr Hobson’s blood pressure and oxygen levels were dangerously low as a result him being positioned face down for the surgery. While a later surgery successfully addressed the spinal condition, Mr Hobson was rendered paraplegic as a result of the second urgent surgery. He brought an action in negligence against the hospital and members of his treating team, including Dr Sparks and the principal surgeon Dr Grey. The trial judge found that both doctors had been negligent in not terminating the surgery 13 minutes sooner than they did, and that s 5O could not be made out. The defendants appealed to the NSW Court of Appeal.

Dr Grey was successful in establishing that he had not been negligent, but a majority of the Court of Appeal found that Dr Sparks had been negligent in failing to terminate the surgery sooner. Justice McFarlan and Justice Simpson accepted that they were bound by the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in McKenna v Hunter & New England Local Health District [2013] NSWCA 476. Here, the court held that in order for s 5O to be established, a medical practitioner must demonstrate that what he or she did conformed with a practice that was in existence at the time the medical service was provided. Then, he or she must establish that that practice was widely (although not necessarily universally) accepted by peer professional opinion as competent professional practice.

Justice Basten rejected the requirement that there be “a practice” (described as a “regular course of conduct adopted in particular circumstances”), on the basis that the Court of Appeal’s decision in McKenna was overturned on appeal to the High Court and its reasoning was no longer binding. However, His Honour agreed with Justice McFarlan (but on different grounds) that Dr Grey’s evidence was insufficient to establish s 5O.

The majority’s judgment in Sparks v Hobson narrows the scope of the operation of s 5O, meaning that it will not be available in circumstances where the defendant cannot show that he or she followed a discrete, established “practice”. This includes in unusual factual situations or potentially, situations involving new medical techniques or procedures. The High Court recently denied an application for leave to appeal from the Court of Appeal’s decision.

“Irrational”

Under s 5O(2) peer professional opinion cannot be relied upon for the purposes of s 5O(1) if the court considers that the opinion is “irrational”. The NSW Court of Appeal considered the meaning of this term in South Western Sydney Local Health District v Gould [2018] NSWCA 69. The plaintiff, a young boy, slipped and fell on wet concrete and injured his thumb. He was administered antibiotics at Campbelltown Hospital and a different antibiotic at Liverpool Hospital, which he was transferred to in the evening on the day of the incident. However, gangrene developed in his thumb after he was discharged and it was amputated. The plaintiff successfully brought a claim in negligence against the health district responsible for Liverpool Hospital. The trial judge found that the treating team at Liverpool Hospital had been negligent in failing to give the plaintiff an additional course of a different antibiotic, and that the opinion of the defendant’s two expert witnesses (that the additional course of antibiotics was not required) was irrational under s 5O(2).

On appeal to the NSW Court of Appeal, Justice Leeming (with whom Meaghar J agreed) made a series of comments on s 5O after considering the history, objective and statutory context of the provision. Justice Leeming concluded that ([96]):

Text, context and purpose [of s 5O] all support the conclusion that it is a seriously pejorative and exceptional thing to find that a professional person has expressed an opinion that is ‘irrational’ and even more exceptional if the opinion be widely held. To consider a body of opinion to be ‘irrational’ is a stronger conclusion than merely disagreeing with it, or preferring a competing body of peer professional opinion.

Justice Leeming held that the trial judge had erred by conflating the process of resolving a conflict between competing expert opinions “with the entirely different process required by s 5O(2) of determining whether an opinion is ‘irrational’” ([65]). It was also procedurally unfair for the trial judge to find the evidence of the defendant’s witnesses irrational when this point had not been argued at trial or raised with either party. Further, the evidence of the defendant’s witnesses was sufficient to establish s 5O(1) and the appeal was allowed.

Does s 5O operate as a defence?

Based on the decision in Dobler v Halveson (2007) 70 NSWLR 151, s 5O has commonly been interpreted as a defence, meaning that the plaintiff must establish a breach of the duty of care for the purposes of s 5B of the CLA (as well as the other elements of negligence), following which the defendant must raise evidence that his or her conduct accorded with competent professional practice for the purposes of s 5O.

In Gould, Justice Leeming commented that the proper interpretation of Dobler was that if the defendant could establish the preconditions in s 5O, then it would act to set the standard of care. If the preconditions in s 5O could not be established then ss 5B and 5C of the CLA would apply. However, “[t]here is no occasion to compare the s 5O standard with that which would be considered in the application of s 5B in a case where the preconditions of s 5O have been made out” ([129]). Justice Leeming noted that this interpretation of s 5O was also suggested by Justice Basten and Justice Simpson in Sparks v Hobson. In that case, Justice Basten commented that ([18]):

…once s 5O is invoked, arguably the general exercise required by s 5B becomes otiose. There can only be one standard against which to judge the conduct of a professional defendant, although that standard may depend upon the resolution of conflicting evidence called by the plaintiff and the defendant. It is only if one takes the plaintiff’s evidence in isolation that a two-stage process, involving the assessment of the plaintiff’s claim followed by assessment of an affirmative defence, will arise. However, in a practical sense, that is not how the dispute should be determined. Rather, a judgment will be given based on all of the evidence. Nor is the exercise helpfully clarified by speaking of shifting burdens of proof. The question for the trial judge is ultimately whether the plaintiff has established that the conduct of the defendant failed to comply with the relevant standard of care.

According to Justice Basten, s 5O will be engaged where there is evidence of a widely accepted professional practice supporting the defendant’s conduct, but that evidence, when available, will set the relevant standard: “there cannot be two legally supportable standards operating in the one case” ([24]). So while the defendant may need to establish the elements of s 5O, it is the starting point for determining the standard of care owed by the defendant and whether the defendant fell below the standard of care – not a defence that is considered after breach has been established for the purposes of s 5B of the CLA.

“Professional”

The word “professional” is not defined in s 5O. It clearly extends to medical professions, but it is unclear which other professions it might include. The meaning of the word “profession” was considered in Zhang v Hardas (No 2) [2018] NSWSC 432. In this case, Ms Zhang sued Mr Hardas, a chiropractor, alleging that he had been negligent in treating her over 12 consultations between February and September 2007, causing her to develop a depressive disorder. The case concerned Mr Hardas use of an “activator” device on Ms Zhang’s spine, which delivered a significant force to the spine for the purpose of moving bones in the spine. Ms Zhang alleged that the device had been applied hundreds of times to her cervical spine during each of the consultations with Mr Hardas.

Justice Leeming in the NSW Supreme Court rejected this argument, with the evidence supporting Mr Hardas’ position that the device had been used no more than a dozen times during each session with Ms Zhang. Further, it was not reasonably foreseeable that a person of normal fortitude might suffer a recognized psychiatric injury as a result of undergoing treatment with the activator device when it was used no more than a dozen times on each occasion. However, Justice Leeming considered whether s 5O would apply, if His Honour was incorrect on the point of whether the plaintiff owed the defendant a duty of care, as argued by the defendant.

Justice Leeming considered whether Mr Hardas, as a chiropractor, could be said to be “practicing a profession”. After reviewing the history of professionalization, Justice Leeming stated that he preferred the view “that the essential nature of practising a profession is closely linked to a partial monopoly, justified by education and public benefit, and involving a measure of altruism distinct from the drive for profit” ([144]). However, Justice Leeming did not express a conclusive view of the meaning of the word “profession” for the purposes of s 5O, but instead confined his decision to the narrower question of whether chiropractors practiced a profession.

Justice Leeming noted that at the time the incident occurred, chiropractors were regulated under a series of acts, including the Chiropractors Act 2001 (NSW), the Health Care Complaints Act 1993 (NSW) and the Public Health Act 1991 (NSW). The Chiropractors Act established a Registration Board that developed a code of professional conduct for chiropractors and also included definitions of “professional misconduct” and “unsatisfactory professional conduct.” Public complaints could be made to the board, and the Act also established a Chiropractors Tribunal that dealt with complaints that could involve suspending or cancelling a chiropractor’s registration. The Public Health Act provided that a person could not engage in spinal manipulation unless they were a registered chiropractor.

Justice Leeming concluded that s 5O “was enacted in a context in which (a) it was plain that the conventional medical profession was squarely within the mischief to which it was directed and (b) legislation treated chiropractors in ways which were similar to medical practitioners”, including through the creation of a tribunal dealing with instances of professional misconduct, combined with statutory concepts of professional misconduct and unsatisfactory professional conduct ([169]).

The Chiropractors Act 2001 also consistently treated chiropractors as professionals and “there is every reason for the defined term “professional” in s 5O to extend to occupations regarded by the same Legislature as professional” ([169]). Accordingly, chiropractors could be regarded as practising a profession for the purposes of the provision. Further, “the notion of a licensed monopoly of people who practice spinal manipulation, with educational qualifications and mechanisms for admitting and excluding those who meet or fail to meet those standards, also appears to apply” ([170]).

Mr Hardas could establish that he had acted in a manner that was widely accepted in Australia as competent professional practice as he had established that the “activator technique” was widely accepted in Australia, and the fact that other chiropractors used different methods did not prevent him from establishing that he had followed competent professional practice (s 5O(3)). Justice Leeming left to one side the issue of whether s 5O required the defendant to establish that he or she had followed “a practice” but noted that Mr Hardas’ conduct would have met this requirement if necessary.

 

Santa, Coke and Christmas: Why we need legislative restrictions on unhealthy food marketing to children

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Laws in many countries prohibit false and misleading advertising. The recent case of ACCC v Heinz (which I discussed in a blog post last week) shows how these laws can knock out false and misleading food advertisements. But what about the perfectly legal promotions for unhealthy foods and beverages that fill our TV screens, social media platforms, billboards, and bus shelters?

In some countries, governments are moving to reduce children’s exposure to unhealthy food marketing by placing legislative restrictions on when and where unhealthy food products can be marketed. For example, Chile has banned unhealthy food advertisements on TV before 10pm, along with a range of other obesity-prevention measures.

In countries like the US, Australia, and NZ, restrictions on unhealthy food marketing are found in self-regulatory codes developed by the food or advertising industries. However, these codes often contain significant loopholes and do little to reduce children’s exposure to unhealthy food marketing. This is illustrated by two complaints recently determined by New Zealand’s Advertising Standards Complaints Board.

The Complaints Board hears public complaints about breaches of the Children and Young People’s Advertising Code, developed by an advertising industry body. Following a recent review, the Code now contains a series of principles and rules on the marketing of “occasional food and beverage products” to children and young people. These products are identified using a Ministry of Health nutrient profiling system that distinguishes between “everyday”, “sometimes”, and “occasional” foods. The Code also distinguishes between children (aged under 14 years) and young people (aged 14-17 years).

Principle 1 of the Code states that “[a]dvertisements targeted at children or young people must not contain anything that is likely to result in their physical, mental or moral harm and must observe a high standard of social responsibility.” Among the rules listed under this principle are (1)(i), which states that “[a]dvertisements (including sponsorship advertisements) for occasional food or beverage products must not target children or be placed in any media where children are likely to be a significant proportion of the expected average audience.”

Under rule 1(j) advertisers must exercise a special duty of care in advertising occasional food and beverage products to young people (as opposed to children).

The Code uses three criteria to determine whether an ad targets children or young people: (1) whether the nature and intended purpose of the advertised product or service is principally or generally appealing to children/young people; (2) whether the presentation of the advertisement content (e.g., theme, images, colours, wording) is appealing to children/young people; and (3) whether the expected average audience at the time or place the advertisement appears includes a significant proportion of children/young people. Measures for determining the likely child audience of an advertisement include whether a medium’s audience comprises 25% or more children; whether the medium appears in child viewing time zones; whether a medium contains content with significant appeal to children; and whether an ad appears in locations where children gather, e.g., schools and playgrounds.

Principle 3 of the Code states that “[a] special duty of care must be exercised for Occasional Food and Beverage Product sponsorship advertising targeted to young people.” The rules under this principle include 3(a), which prevents sponsorship advertising from depicting an occasional food or beverage product, such product’s packaging, or consumption of such products.

Healthy Together Auckland has laid a series of complaints that aim to test the Code’s rules on unhealthy food marketing.

One recent complaint concerned an advertisement on a bus shelter in close proximity to a primary school and a secondary school, and to shops where a large number of children and young people stopped on their way to and from school. The advertisement (pictured above) featured Santa Clause riding in a car holding two bottles of Coke, one a no-sugar version of the product, and the other a “classic” or “full sugar” version. It included the logos for Youthline (a help line for young people) and Coca-Cola, and text encouraging donations to Youthline.

The Board upheld the complaint that the ad was a sponsorship advertisement for an occasional beverage that targeted children and young people.

In considering whether the ad targeted children and young people, the Board held that full-sugar Coke was a product that appealed to children and young people and was an occasional beverage. In relation to the content of the ad, the Board said that Youthline would not have strong appeal to children, but would with young people – Youthline’s target audience. Crucially, Santa Claus was the most prominent image in the ad, and has strong appeal with children and is closely associated with Christmas, and children asking Santa for presents, all of which would encourage children to engage with the ad. According to the Board, while Santa has less appeal for young people, his particular presentation in this ad (e.g., riding in a car) would appeal to the 14-17 year age group.

The Board held that children under the age of 14 years were unlikely to be a significant proportion of the ad’s audience (given the bus shelter’s distance from the primary school), but it would be seen by a significant proportion of young people, as it was close to the secondary school, and young people caught the bus from the stop that the ad appeared at and would gather at near-by shops.

Accordingly, the Board held that the ad breached Principle 1 and rule 1(i) of the Code by promoting an occasional beverage to children, as well as Principle 3 and rule 3(a), but note rule 1(j) (on exercising special care in unhealthy food marketing to young people) or another rule on the responsible use of characters that are popular with children (1(h)).

While this first complaint was upheld in part, a second complaint, related to Coca-Cola Christmas in the Park events held in Auckland and Christchurch, was dismissed by the Board.

The complaint concerned the events themselves, as well as event promotions that appeared on bus shelters, in newspapers and on news websites, and included fireworks, people dancing on a stage, and the messaging, “Coca-Cola Christmas in the Park. Supporting Youthline. Merry Christmas from Coca-Cola. Come share the magic.” The complainant was also concerned that hundreds of free Coke drinks were given away to children at the events, who made up a large percentage of the audience.

The Board held that it did not have the jurisdiction to consider the event itself or the product give-aways at the event. This was because the events did not constitute “advertising” for the purposes of the Code: they were a “community initiative”, of which Coke was one of many sponsors, and the event’s intended purpose was entertainment rather than influencing the choice, opinion or behaviour of consumers to purchase the product, as required by the Code’s definition of advertising.

Promotions for the events could be defined as sponsorship advertisements, meaning that they fell within the scope of the Code. However, there were no images of Coke products in the advertisement, and while the ad did include the Coke logo, the focus of the ad was on promoting the events rather than persuading views to purchase Coke. Accordingly, the ads did not promote an occasional food or beverage.

The creative content of the ads would have appeal to children and young people, as would Christmas in the Park, Youthline and the Coca-Cola Company Brand. However, the Board held that the placement of the ads was directed to parents, as children would not comprise 25% of more of the readers or viewers of the media that the ads appeared in (e.g., the New Zealand Herald), and on balance, it was unlikely that the ads would be seen by a significant proportion of children.

As the ads did not promote an occasional food or beverage product and were not targeted to children, the Board determined that the ads did not breach any of the Code’s principles and rules on food marketing to children and young people.

The New Zealand Code contains rules that are stronger in some respects than similar rules found in codes in other jurisdictions, including the two codes developed by the food industry  in Australia. For example, the New Zealand Code restricts unhealthy food marketing in settings where children gather (including around shops or bus shelters, as illustrated by the first complaint). Equivalent restrictions in the Australian codes only apply to pre-schools, primary schools and daycare centres.  However, these complaints illustrate that the New Zealand Code still contains a number of key loopholes that are common to regulation on food marketing to children in other jurisdictions.

The first of these is the need to identify advertising that is targeted to or appeals to children, as distinct from families or parents. While the Code contain a relatively strong definition of advertising that is targeted to children, it can still allows advertisers to use creative content that children find appealing. Coke asserts that it doesn’t market its products to children under 12, and claims that the association of Coke with Christmas and Santa is aimed at families rather than children. This ignores the fact that, as the Complaints Board has pointed out, Santa and Christmas have significant appeal to children, and marketing using this imagery is likely to be attractive and persuasive to children, regardless of the target audience. However, in the second complaint the Board held that Coke’s ads were not targeted to children as they appeared in media with large adult or family audiences, despite using imagery that appealed to children. In short, Coke respects the letter but ignores the spirit of its own self-imposed restriction – and in this instance, the Code permitted it to do so.

The second problem is that the NZ code (and other self-regulatory codes) continue to exclude some marketing techniques commonly used by food companies. As illustrated by the second complaint, these include brand advertising, where companies promote a particular brand, but not the products associated with that brand, which may be unhealthy. By imposing restrictions on the types of products advertised to children, the Code allows companies like Coke to circumvent restrictions by marketing only the Coca-Cola brand without featuring images of the product itself.

A third problem is that these codes are based on a single advertisement model. The Board may uphold a complaint about one advertisement, but its determination doesn’t necessarily address a sophisticated, widespread campaign that promotes a product across a number of different platforms. Further, a complaints-based system only puts a tiny dent in children and young people’s cumulative, on-going exposure to a large volume of unhealthy food marketing.

This last issue is partly due to deficiencies in the governance processes attached to self-regulatory codes, in addition to loopholes in their substantive terms and conditions. Frequently, there are no sanctions for non-compliance, nor is there any kind of systematic, independent monitoring of compliance, meaning that it’s up to advocacy groups to identify problematic ads and report them to complaint bodies.

We have legislative restrictions on false and misleading food advertising. Given the problems with self-regulatory codes on unhealthy food marketing to children, perhaps it’s time for legislation on that issue too.

 

ACCC v Heinz: A significant win for public health

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In a significant victory for public health, Australia’s Federal Court has held that Heinz engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct in the marketing of a snack food targeted to toddlers (ACCC v Heinz [2018] FCA 360). The case should be seen as a win for public health not just because of the final outcome, but also because of the Court’s discussion of the World Health Organisation guidelines on sugar consumption, as well as parents’ purchasing habits and children’s health.

The case followed a complaint laid by the Obesity Policy Coalition in 2015 about the marketing of a product called “Shredz” which formed part of Heinz’s “Little Kids” range, targeted to children aged 1-3 years. This product consisted of a chewy fruit-flavoured “stick” that was sold in an 18g packet of five sticks. Each box contained five 18g packets of the product, which came in three flavours: berry, peach, and fruit and chia.

The packaging for each of the three flavours varied slightly, but each featured a stylized representation of a tree on the front of the box, with an image of a smiling boy climbing the ladder (see picture above). At the base of the tree was a photograph of various pieces of fruit, sweetcorn kernels, and pieces of pumpkin, along with a prominent depiction of four sticks of the product. Among the text on the front of the box were the words “99% fruit and veg”, “No preservatives” and “No artificial colours or flavours.” The back of the box included the text “Made with 99% fruit and vegetable juice and purees…. Our range of snacks and meals encourages your toddler to independently discover the delicious taste of nutritious food. With our dedicated nutritionists who are also mums, we aim to inspire a love of nutritious food that lasts a life time.” A side panel on the box stated that “Our wide range of snacks and meals is packed with the tasty goodness of vegetables, fruits, grains, meat and pasta to provide nutritious options for your toddler.”

The back of the box also featured an ingredients list and a nutrition information panel required by the Australia New Zealand Food Standards Code. The ingredients list revealed that the product contained 36% apple paste and 31% apple juice concentrate, with the remainder of the product comprising berry, peach, or strawberry puree (approximately 10%), sweetcorn puree (10%) ,and pumpkin puree (10%) (with the fruit and chia version also containing chia seeds). Due to the reliance on apple paste and apple juice concentrate, over two-thirds of the product consisted of sugar.

Before Justice White in the Federal Court, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) alleged that the packaging of each product contravened ss 18, 29(1)(a), 29(1)(g) and 33 of the Australian Consumer Law, which is contained in a schedule to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth).

Section 18 was the key provision in the case. It provides that “[a] person must not, in trade or commerce, engage in conduct that is misleading or deceptive, or is likely to mislead or deceive.” Section 29 provides that “[a] person must not, in trade or commerce, in connection with the supply or possible supply of goods or services or in connection with the promotion by any means of the supply or use of goods or services (a) make a false or misleading representation that goods are of a particular standard, quality, value, grade, composition, style or model or have had a particular history or particular previous use; or… (g) make a false or misleading representation that goods or services has sponsorship, approval, performance characteristics, accessories, uses or benefits…”

Section 33 provides that “[a] person must not, in trade or commerce, engage in conduct that is liable to mislead the public as to the nature, manufacturing process, the characteristics, the suitability for their purpose or the quantity of any goods.”

The ACCC alleged that Heinz had breached these provisions because statements and images on the box impliedly conveyed representations to the effect that the product:

  • Was of an equivalent nutritional value to the natural fruit and vegetables depicted on the packaging;
  • Was a nutritious food and was beneficial to the health of children aged 1-3 years; and
  • Encouraged the development of healthy eating habits for children aged 1-3 years.

At the outset, Justice White commented that the issue for the Court to determine was whether (a) the specific representations alleged by the ACCC were made, and if so, (b) whether they were misleading and deceptive (or in the case of s 33, liable to mislead). The Court was not required to determine other issues raised during the hearing, including whether the product had an inappropriate amount of sugar per se, and whether it would be sensible for parents to give the product to their children as an alternative to fruit and vegetables. The focus of the Court was on whether the product packaging made specific representations alleged by the ACCC, and if so, whether those representations were false and misleading.

Focusing on the berry version of the product, Justice White found that representations (a) and (c) above could not be established. However, Justice White held that the packaging would convey to the ordinary and reasonable consumer – here the ordinary and reasonable parent of a toddler – that the product was nutritious and beneficial to the health of toddlers (representation (b)).

For the purposes of the case, the ACCC had obtained internal documents from Heinz, which enabled scrutiny of the processes used to manufacture the product, and the way in which it was marketed. One of these documents discussed a “brand refresh,” which indicated that Heinz intended to use the product packaging to promote Shredz as nutritious and healthy.

However, Justice White held that “[e]ven a cursory examination of the packaging indicates that Heinz was promoting the Berries Product as being healthy and nutritious and that ordinary reasonable consumers would have understood that that was so.” [99] Imagery on the packaging, including depictions of a healthy young boy climbing a tree, combined with statements that the product comprised 99% fruit and vegetables, gave the impression of nutritiousness and health. The ingredient list and nutrition information panel (which indicated that Shredz comprised 60% sugar) would not detract from this overall impression, as they were on the back of the box, in smaller print, and could be regarded as “fine print.” Particularly in the context of a busy supermarket trip, ordinary, reasonable parents were likely to pass over them, “and to respond to the dominant message conveyed by the more prominent words and imagery.” [101]

Having established that the product packaging conveyed a representation that the product was a nutritious food and beneficial for the health of toddlers, Justice White then considered whether this representation was false and misleading. In determining this issue, Justice White made extensive reference to expert witness evidence led by the ACCC and Heinz. Central to the ACCC’s case was the evidence led by Dr Rosemary Stanton, a prominent Australian nutritionist. One of Heinz’s witnesses included a consultant nutritionist who had a “continuing association” with the Australian sugar industry, which was not disclosed in his written report, raising concerns about his independence.

In establishing that representation (b) was misleading and deceptive, the ACCC placed particular reliance on the fact that the product was high in sugar. Justice White held that while the ACCC could not establish that the product was not nutritious (given that it contained some nutrients necessary for human life), the high levels of sugar in the product were not beneficial to the health of toddlers. In coming to this conclusion, Justice White referred to the World Health Organisation’s 2015 guideline for sugar intake for adults and children, which recommends that intake of free sugars be reduced to less than 10% of total energy intake, (or conditionally, to less than 5% of total energy intake), in order to maintain a healthy weight and good dental health. “Free sugars” are defined to include those present in fruit juices and concentrates.

Evidence from Dr Stanton showed that one 18g serve of the product was 19% higher in sugar than one 100g serve of fruit and vegetables. Further, a single 18g serve of Shredz contained just under three teaspoons of free sugars, more than one half of the recommended daily intake of free sugars for 1-2 year olds, and over 35% for three year olds. Justice White also referred to statistics on sugar intake in Australia, including that 2-3 year olds have an average daily intake of free sugars of 9-10 teaspoons, well in excess of the WHO guidelines, and that the majority of free sugars are consumed from energy-dense, nutrient-poor “discretionary” foods and beverages.

Of particular influence on the judge’s decision was evidence of the role of free sugars in promoting tooth decay, given by an “impressive witness” with expertise in child oral health. Dental caries is prevalent among Australian children (with 48% of five year olds having tooth decay that requires treatment such as fillings), and poor diet  (particularly foods and beverages high in sugar) is a key contributing factor to dental decay. Justice White accepted evidence that consumption of the product would increase children’s risk of developing dental caries, due to its stickiness and high sugar content.

Justice White also accepted the ACCC’s submission that an assessment of the dental and other health risks posed by the product needed to take account of other aspects of a toddler’s diet (including that toddlers are likely to consume free sugars from other sources), rather than considering the dietary impact of the product in isolation, as argued by Heinz. This position illustrates the limitations of the food industry’s argument that there are no “bad” foods. When viewed in isolation, it could be argued that a product that contributes half of a child’s recommended sugar intake is not detrimental to health. But this argument is much less persuasive when we consider what a toddler is likely to eat over an entire day – even a child with a relatively healthy diet.

Given the high level of sugar contained in a single serve of Shredz, and taking into account the totality of children’s diets (and likely free sugar consumption from other sources), Justice White concluded that it was “not easy to accept that consumption of that amount of sugar in a single snack can be regarded as beneficial to the health of 1-3 year olds.’ This was particularly so given that excess weight and obesity are a significant problem among Australian children (with more than a quarter of Australian being overweight or obese), and having regard to the role of sugars in the development of dental caries, as well significant problems in achieving good hygiene practices among Australian young children. As the high levels of sugar in the product were not beneficial to the health of toddlers, Justice White concluded that the second representation was misleading and deceptive or was likely to mislead and deceive.

Accordingly, the packaging of the berry version of the product contravened s 18(1) of the Australian Consumer Law. Justice White also reached the same conclusion in relation to the packaging of the peach and fruit and chia versions of the product. The ACCC was not able to establish a contravention of s 29(1)(a) or s 33 of the ACC, but in showing that Heinz had made a misleading and deceptive statement about the healthiness of the product, Justice White held that it had also made a misleading or deceptive statement about the “benefits” of the product for the purpose of s 29(1)(g). Although not required for the purposes of establishing a breach of the relevant provisions, the ACCC also managed to establish that Heinz knew or ought to have known that it had made a representation that the productions were nutritious and beneficial to the health of toddlers, and that this representation was false or misleading.

The outcome of ACCC v Heinz is a clear victory for public health advocates who are concerned about the way in which unhealthy food products are marketed to children and their parents. The case illustrates the valuable role that World Health Organisation guidelines can play in the courts’ consideration of public health issues, in addition to evidence of the growing problems of obesity and poor dental health among Australian children. The case also demonstrates the natural affinities between childhood obesity prevention and improving children’s dental health, which could perhaps be exploited more fully by child health advocates.

However, the case does not address one of the key concerns about the marketing of unhealthy foods and beverages, which is the cumulative impact on children and parents of exposure to a large volume of perfectly legal and truthful food marketing campaigns, appearing in many times, forms, and places. While Australia has stringent restrictions on misleading and deceptive marketing, there is little regulation of the large volume of (truthful) marketing for unhealthy foods, exposure to which makes a small but significant contribution to childhood weight gain.

This problem, and potential solutions, will be discussed in my next blogpost.

Upcoming events: The Food Governance Showcase

Food-Governance-Hand-berries

On Friday the 3rd of November, Sydney Health Law is co-hosting the Food Governance Showcase at the University of Sydney’s Charles Perkins Centre.

The Showcase will present new research from University of Sydney researchers and affiliates, examining the role of law, regulation and policy in creating a healthy, equitable, and sustainable food system. The Showcase will feature presentations on a wide variety of topics, including food safety law in China, Australia’s Health Star Rating System, and taxes on unhealthy foods and micronutrients.

The Showcase will open with a panel event featuring three legal experts, who will speak on a specific area of law (including tax law, planning law and international trade law), and how it impacts on nutrition and diet-related health.

Later in the day, a speaker from NSW Health will discuss the Department’s new framework for healthy food and beverages in its health facilities.

Further information about the Showcase, including the program, is available here.

The event is free, but registration is essential.

Any questions about the Showcase can be directed to Belinda Reeve (the co-organiser): Belinda.reeve@sydney.edu.au

 

The ten secrets to surviving Law School REVEALED

 

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OK, that title was complete clickbait. And usually this is a blog about health law. But we run a Master of Health Law program, and with second semester now upon us (welcome back, students), I thought I’d try something different.

The first year of Law School is tough. I didn’t enjoy it very much and I spent a lot of time flailing around, not entirely sure what I was doing.

I feel like I have a slightly better idea now that I’ve completed two undergraduate degrees and a PhD, and started working as a lecturer.

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Me, but not really.

So, having lived to tell the tale, here are my top ten tips for surviving law school.

  1. Come to class

I get it. All the lectures are recorded these days, so why bother getting out of your pajamas and coming to class? First, research shows that attending lectures can improve students’ academic performance. Second (and just as important), university can be a lonely place. Lectures are a reason to get out of bed, put on real clothes, and interact with other human beings. Who knows? You may even make a new friend. Lectures give your day a sense of structure, and they could even help us learn to listen without checking Facebook or doing a spot of online shopping.

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  1. Read the cases

Every semester I get this question:

Do I really need to read the cases?

The answer is yes. Emphatically, and unequivocally.

Along with statutes, cases are our source of law – not your lecturer, and not the textbook. Lecturers may explain the principle deriving from a case, but if you don’t know the facts or the reasoning behind the decision, how will you know if that principle can be applied to the facts in a problem question? Further down the track, when you’re a practicing lawyer, your client’s case may turn on the meaning of the word “reasonable.” And he or she will expect you to have read and understood all of the relevant cases on what “reasonable” means. There’s a lot of reading, I know, but cases become easier to read with practice, and your writing will improve as your reading does.

Judgments are the foundation of our discipline and our practice, and it makes me feel like this when students seem to think that reading cases isn’t necessary.

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  1. Learn how to learn

Law School’s simple, right? Come to class, read cases, take notes, done.

Not so much.

You need to learn a number of new skills along with cramming your head full of content. These include: writing a concise case summary, learning how to answer a problem question, and conveying information effectively in oral and written form. It took me a long time to learn that just taking screeds of notes was not the path to effective study. Learn from my mistakes and think critically about what you’re doing. The Law School has a number of resources for learning the skills required to be a successful law student, and a book like this one may also help.

  1. Get to know how special consideration and appeal processes work – right now

The University of Sydney has a central process for dealing with (most) special consideration requests, and for disability services. It’s a good idea to know about these services before you need to use them. Don’t be the person panicking on the day of the exam because you’re sick and can’t sit the exam, and don’t know what to do next. The same goes for appealing your marks. Hopefully you won’t need to use these processes, but it’s good to have at least a passing familiarity with how they work, just in case you do.

  1. Get help when you need it

There are often a lot of things happening in your life during your time at university: break-ups, moving out of home, an all-you-can-eat seafood buffet that really was too good to be true.  It may feel like there’s no one there to help if you if you’re struggling. But the University has a range of services, including counselling, and the Law School offers various forms of support. Please talk to your tutor or lecturer if you have issues that are affecting your study. They may not be able to solve every problem, but they can offer strategies for catching up on work, for example. There is help available if you reach out, and it’s better to do so sooner rather than later when everything’s falling apart.

  1. Check your email

You’ve emailed me (your lecturer) about an important, life-changing event. I’ve emailed you back. You don’t check your email for a week. There’s not much I can do in the meantime, and it’s frustrating. Check your university email regularly. If you don’t think you’ll remember to do it, set up a redirect so it goes to another account that you do check on a regular basis.

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  1. Manage stress

One thing that I found invaluable during my time as a student (and in life more generally), is learning techniques for managing stress. This could mean mindfulness, exercise, catching up with friends – whatever works for you, so long as it’s sustainable and beneficial in the long run. Sitting exams and submitting assignments are stressful, and we’ve got to learn how to deal. Remember that prevention is better than cure, and regularly engaging in activities like exercise may help to avoid a death spiral of depression and anxiety.

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#blessed.
  1. Get involved

It’s often difficult for students to find time for anything but study or work. But one thing I sincerely regret not doing when I was an undergraduate is participating in the life of my faulty more. This could be performing in the Law Revue, it could be mooting, it could be only the occasional social event. I understand that students may feel like they don’t fit in, or that those sorts of things are not for them. But I can tell you from talking to my students that it’s not uncommon to feel that way. Maybe this is something faculties need to think about. But please don’t let feelings of not-fitting-in (or just plain shyness) stop you from attending events.

  1. Make the most of your degree

There’s a lot of talk about how competitive it is to get a job in law these days, particularly with the increasing number of graduates coming out of law schools. Students don’t need any more pressure to hustle to get a good job when they finish their degree. But you will get out of university what you put in. This means using your time at university to look for opportunities that will help you move towards the career you want to be in when you graduate. I’m not necessarily talking about creating a start-up to help you get a job in a law firm. I put in an application for an obscure summer scholarship that was advertised on a notice board, and that move changed the trajectory of my whole career. There are a variety of opportunities available at University, and it’s important to be proactive in searching out the ones that suit you best.

  1. Have… fun (?)

This blog post could end with a picture of happy smiling students strolling across the law school lawn, and with me saying something like, “Enjoy yourself! University is the best experience of your life, blah blah.” But law school is often demanding, and it’s not necessarily a rewarding experience being broke and living in a share house with people who may or may not have fleas.

So my final suggestion is not “have fun,” but “persist.” You will not like every course. In some, making it through the end of the lecture may be a triumph, and in those courses, survival may be the name of the game.

But you will find courses that you enjoy, and moments where you feel like you have conquered the subject. This is what makes it all worthwhile, as well as finally getting your degree at the end. And what makes it worth it for me is seeing my students getting to graduation, and then moving on to even greater things. Good luck.

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I see you Australian Law Memes

Ps. University is a great time to experiment with your style, and if you feel like dying your hair blue, then go for it. It becomes harder to do things like that once you have a serious job, like being a law lecturer. Just don’t do it right before your clerkship interview.

 

Upcoming events: Engaging with Advocates

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On Friday the 28th of July, Sydney Health Law is hosting Engaging with Advocates, along with the Food Governance Node and the Healthy Food Systems Node at the Charles Perkins Centre.

This event aims to connect early career researchers with leading civil society advocates in order to foster collaboration and increase the impact of research. Representatives of organizations working on the sustainability of food systems, promoting healthier diets, and championing consumer rights will share personal experiences of using research in their efforts to improve policy, and offer insights for academics looking to strengthen the practical relevance of their research.

This event will feature keynote presentations by:

  • CHOICE
  • The Live Lighter Campaign (Heart Foundation Western Australia); and
  • Sustain: The Australian Food Network

The keynote presentations will be followed by a session where participants workshop “live” policy issues, and the event will conclude with networking drinks.

While the event is targeted at early-career researchers, academics at every level are welcome to attend, as are members of civil society and government organisations, and others who are interested. Further information can be found at this link.

We hope to see you there!