Religious discrimination in Australian health law: hype or reality?

Queensland has passed the Voluntary Assisted Dying Act 2021.

I’m disappointed in Queensland’s Parliament, not for passing assisted dying legislation, but for consciously trampling over the religious beliefs of Catholic and other religious healthcare organisations.

Catholic hospitals are right to be aggrieved.  It’s entirely predictable that church institutions are now considering civil disobedience. (See “Catholic Hospitals’ Revolt on Euthanasia” Weekend Australian 21-22 August 2021, p 4. See also here).

I mean, if you genuinely believe that intentional killing is wrong, you don’t just help it along because a bunch of politicians told you to, do you?

Catholic moral beliefs preclude intentional killing, yet Queensland’s law will force Catholic hospitals to open their doors and to facilitate actions to end the lives of patients in their care, on their premises, by non-credentialed doctors who do not share their moral values.

The passage of assisted dying laws in Victoria (2017), Western Australia (2019), Tasmania (2021), South Australia (2021), and now Queensland illustrates the growing heft of personal autonomy as a secular value in Australian life.

(I call this the “Dombrink thesis”, after American scholar Professor John Dombrink, who demonstrated the resilience of libertarianism, through – and despite – America’s culture wars.  See here, here, and here.)

Recent assisted dying laws follow on the heels of two decades of reform that have greatly liberalised abortion laws in every State and Territory; see eg here, here, and here.

But if personal autonomy means anything, it ought to extend to those who, despite these changes, have a sincere, morally-grounded opposition to killing and assisted suicide.

In my view, co-opting religious health care organisations to facilitate euthanasia is a step too far.

For further detail on what Queensland’s new law will force religious health care facilities to do, see below.

 

Sharing the love? The importance of singing in church in the middle of a pandemic

Let’s be clear: not all complaints of discrimination or oppression, by churches, in Australia’s largely tolerant democracy, are worthy.

For example, in a Facebook post on 2 July, Pastor Brian Houston of Hillsong fame dismissed Covid delta outbreak restrictions that prohibited singing in church as “religious discrimination…so archaic it’s hard to believe”.

He urged his followers: “Let’s make a stand”.

Judging by their responses, some of Houston’s followers are primed for persecution and reluctant to see themselves as beholden to earthly laws (that is, emergency public health orders).

On 16 June 2021, an outbreak of the insanely infectious delta variant of the Covid virus began in New South Wales.  Daily cases are currently averaging over 1200; see here.

On 20 June, masks became mandatory in “places of public worship, being used for public worship or religious services”, in 7 local government areas.

On 23 June, singing in non-residential premises – including places of worship – was banned. However, a number of exceptions applied, including singing in a performance or rehearsal, singing in educational institutions, singing for the purposes of instruction in singing, or if “the premises are a place of public worship, and the persons singing are members of a choir”.

On 26 June, the exception for choirs was eliminated.

In response to questions raised at a Religious Communities Forum held on 28 June, NSW Health advised forum members by email that the delta outbreak restrictions operating at that time (the Public Health (Covid-19 Temporary Movement and Gathering Restrictions) Order 2021, dated 26 June 2021) did, indeed, prevent singing in places of worship, even if a religious leader was singing to a largely empty church or place of worship as part of a livestream.  Masks must also be worn.

The intent of the restrictions, NSW Health advised, was to prevent transmission between, for example, a singing pastor, and people providing technical assistance during the livestream, given previous evidence of tansmission via singing in a place of worship.

NSW Liberal MP Tanya Davies raised Houston’s concern with Premier Gladys Berejiklian and Health Minister Brad Hazzard.  Hazzard granted an exemption on 3 July, with specified safeguards: see here.

I suspect that quiet diplomacy by Houston would have been equally effective, if the need for religious leaders to sing directly to camera outweighed the importance of protecting others present in the venue from the risk of acquiring the highly infectious delta variant.

I notice one comment on Pastor Houston’s post:

“It’s time people stopped seeing everything as an attack or discrimination. Seriously we are in a pandemic.  Christian leaders should be setting a good example”.

Amen to that. As to which, see here, and here.

 

Moral arm-twisting in Queensland’s voluntary assisted dying legislation

While some complaints of discrimination by religious leaders are over-blown, I would put Part 6 of Queensland’s Voluntary Assisted Dying Act in a different category.

The new Act respects the right of a health practitioner not to provide information about voluntary assisted dying, nor to participate in the assessment process for lawful access to assisted dying that the legislation makes available (s 84).

However, Part 6 co-opts health practitioners and forces them to facilitate that assessment process, irrespective of their personal beliefs about the ethics of killing.

Let’s count the ways.

Firstly, a health practitioner with a conscientious objection must either refer a patient requesting information on assisted dying to an officially approved “navigator service” for assisted dying, or to a health practitioner who is known not to have moral scruples about assisted dying and may be willing to assist (s 84(2)).

Secondly, a “relevant entity” (meaning a health care establishment such as a hospital, hospice or nursing home) must not hinder a person’s access to information about assisted dying.

In order not to do so, the health facility must provide entry to a registered health practitioner, or member or employee of an approved navigator service in order to “provide the requested information to the person about voluntary assisted dying” (ss 90, 156).

Thirdly, the new Act requires a health care facility operated by a church or religious organisation to provide access to an (external) medical practitioner who is willing to act as the patient’s “coordinating medical practitioner” for the purposes of facilitating assessment and taking the various actions required by the legislation in response to the patient’s first, second and final requests for assistance to die (ss 9, 92-93).

If the medical practitioner requested by the patient is unable to attend, the religious health care organisation must facilitate the transfer of the patient to and from a place where the patient can formally request assistance from a medical practitioner who is willing to act as the coordinating medical practitioner (ss 9, 92(3); 93(3)).

Fourthly, the religious health care facility must facilitate the coordinating medical practitioner (or their delegate) to carry out a “first assessment” of the patient’s eligibility for dying assistance under the Act, either by permitting this to occur within the facility, or by facilitating transfer of the person to and from a place where the assessment can take place (ss 9, 19, 94).

The same obligations apply to the second, independent “consulting assessment” that occurs if the coordinating medical practitioner concludes from the first assessment that the patient is eligible for voluntary assisted dying (ss 9-10, 30, 95).

After making a third and final request, and undergoing a final review, an eligible patient may decide to self-administer a voluntary assisted dying drug or, if advised that this is inappropriate, may choose to have the drug administered by the coordinating practitioner (ss 50, 56).

This step triggers a number of authorisations, including the right to prescribe, supply, possess and self-administer, or administer the drug overdose to the patient (ss 52-53).

Again, the legislation requires a religious health care facility to provide access to the coordinating practitioner so that the patient can choose how the drug will be delivered – whether within the facility, or by assisting transfer and travel to a place outside the facility where these decisions can be made (s 96).

The facility must then provide access to the administering practitioner and witnesses to enable assisted dying to take place on the premises, and must not hinder self-administration if the patient has made a self-administration decision (s 97).

These statutory requirements honour the voluntary assisted dying principle that “a person should be supported in making informed decisions about end of life choices” (s 5(f)), and that “access to voluntary assisted dying…should be available regardless of where a person lives in Queensland” (s 5(e)).

Another principle recognised in the legislation is that “a person’s freedom of thought, conscience, religion and belief and enjoyment of their culture should be respected” (s 5(h)).

However, by forcing religious health care facilities to cooperate in processes whose central aim is intentional killing, (I am not here debating the rigour of safeguards) the legislation tramples over well-known and defended moral values that lie at the heart of professional, competent, yet religiously-informed health care.

The bottom line

Like abortion, assisted dying is one of the enduring ethical fault lines in medicine.

Politicians can’t legislate it away.

Part 6 of Queensland’s Act seems hell-bent on making victims of doctors and religious organisations that have long-standing, deeply felt moral objections to intentional killing.

There ought to be room in Australia’s liberal democracy for religious hospitals and hospices to offer their services, including high-quality palliative care, in accordance with long-standing ethical values, without putting euthanasia on the menu.

Patients who request assessment for assisted dying should be transferred to a facility where such actions do not offend long-standing institutional values, as provided in South Australia’s legislation, which recognises a right of conscientious objection for hospitals and other health care establishments (see s 11, although this does not extend to nursing homes).

A triumph for religious freedom, or viral spreading? The US Supreme Court in Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v Cuomo

During his Presidency, President Trump had the opportunity to appoint three new Justices to the U.S. Supreme Court.

  • In 2017, the acerbic conservative Justice Neil Gorsuch replaced Justice Antonin Scalia;
  • In 2018, Justice Brett Kavanaugh replaced retiring Justice Anthony Kennedy; and
  • In 2020, Justice Amy Coney Barrett replaced Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.

These three appointments have tipped the balance of the Supreme Court strongly in favour of conservatives. The impact of a more conservative court in coming decades may be President Trump’s most enduring legacy.  It is also likely to have a significant impact on American health law.

Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn v Cuomo, discussed in this post, provides an early example of the impact of the Trump appointments within the field of pandemic preparedness and control.

In Cuomo, the Supreme Court considered what is called the “Free Exercise Clause” of the First Amendment, which provides that “Congress shall make no law…prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]”.

Constitutional human rights protections…and health

In many cases, human rights guarantees strengthen the protection of public health.

Take, for example, free speech.  A free and fearless media is enormously important for its role in demanding government accountability.  In authoritarian regimes and one party states, where genuinely free and fair elections only happen elsewhere, the lack of a free media, and the lack of media diversity mean that the government’s performance in addressing health risks rarely becomes the subject of public scrutiny or critique.

This diminishes accountability.  (Yet it’s precisely this idea that the government is accountable to the people that is absent in authoritarian societies).

Freedom of speech and a free media also enable the sharing of information (fact, evidence) and opinion between citizens. This enables people to be informed, and it facilitates debate. It enables people to make their own informed choices, including during elections.

However, it’s not always the case that where the constitution guarantees human rights, that the vindication of these rights will advance the health of the population.

The protection of human rights, and health, are frequently, but in my view not always aligned (whatever the health and human rights school may assert).

This is partly because health is only one of a variety of values that are typically given constitutional protection.  Other values include, as noted, freedom of speech, and freedom of religion.

It’s also partly because – in countries that guarantee human rights in their constitutions – the interpretation of the scope of the constitutional guarantee is a matter for the courts.

In countries where the courts are frequently called on to adjudicate on sensitive political matters, the appointment of justices to the highest appellate courts can become politicised.

Australia, in contrast to the United States, has very few constitutionally protected human rights (and although s 116 of Australia’s Constitution uses very similar language to the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, it has been interpreted very differently.

This does not mean that Australia is not a liberal democracy; what it means is that the balancing of human rights considerations is ultimately a matter for Parliaments – and our democratically elected representatives – rather than for the courts.

New York State’s microcluster Covid strategy

New York State Governor Andrew Cuomo was well known for his daily briefings during mid 2020 as New York City bore the early brunt on Covid-19 infections in the United States. On 6 October 2020, Governor Cuomo signed Executive Order 202.68.

This order stated that the Health Department shall determine areas of the State that by virtue of being designated as red, orange or yellow zones, shall be subject to enhanced public health restrictions based on “cluster-based cases of Covid-19”.

In simple terms, yellow, orange and red zones were areas of the state where Covid-19 cases were rising.  A red zone was an area where the 7-day rolling positivity rate was above 4% for 10 days, and red zone restrictions were intended to prevent spread from a specific area.

A yellow zone was a warning zone where the 7-day rolling positivity rate was above 3% for 10 days.

Amongst other restrictions, in places designated as red zones, places of worship were restricted to “a capacity limit of 25% of maximum occupancy or 10 people, whichever is fewer”.

In places designated as orange zones, “houses of worship shall be subject to a maximum capacity limit of the lesser of 33% of maximum occupancy or 25 people, whichever is fewer”.

In other words, places of worship in red zones were restricted to 10 people, and places of worship in orange zones were restricted to 25 people.

In Australia, at the height of the initial lock-down period in New South Wales (around April 2020), places of worship were closed entirely, with limited exceptions.

I am not aware that this ever led to litigation.

[Covid-related restrictions on freedom of expression and movement, on the other hand, were another story, particularly when it came to the right to participate in demonstrations, including those in support of indigenous rights and the black lives matter movement.  See, for example, here, here, here and here].

At the time of writing (July 2021), New South Wales has been returned to hard lockdown in an effort to eliminate community outbreaks of the delta variant.

By executive order, places of public worship have been closed, although wedding services involving not more than 5 people can take place, and a priest or minister of religion can go to a person’s place to provide pastoral care.

Self-evidently, these restrictions neither denigrate religion nor deny its importance in people’s lives. There are many religions in Australia, many people of faith. These restrictions are temporary, as the chronological record of executive orders illustrates, as Australian State governments have clamped down hard on outbreaks, and then opened up again.

You’ll find the full list of Covid-related public health orders, applicable to NSW, here.

Religion comes first

Coming right in the middle of the Jewish holiday of Sukkot (also known as the Feast of Tabernacles), Orthodox Jewish groups saw Governor Cuomo’s Executive Order as religious discrimination.

An orthodox organisation, Agudath Israel of America, and the Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, sought an injunction against the Executive Order on the basis that it violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.

As noted above, the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment provides that Congress “shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof”.

Although the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment refers to “Congress” (that is, the two Houses of Congress that are the supreme Federal law-making body), the constitutional guarantees also protect against interference by State governments, including Gubernatorial executive decrees.

A triumph for religious freedom…or viral spreading?

In Cuomo, the Supreme Court struck down Governor Cuomo’s order by a 5 to 4 majority.

The majority was made up of Justice Clarence Thomas, Justice Samuel Alito, and the three Trump appointees: Justices Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanagh, and Amy Coney Barrett.

Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh also wrote concurring opinions. Chief Justice Roberts dissented, as did Justices Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayer, and Elena Kagan.

The majority opinion is short.  On p 3, the majority justices agreed that the applicants had demonstrated that the Executive Order was not “neutral” to religion because while a synagogue or church in a red zone could not admit more than 10 persons, these restrictions did not apply to a list of “essential businesses”, which included “acupuncture facilities, camp grounds, garages” and plants manufacturing chemicals and microelectronics”.

I dare say the risks of Covid spread are rather less in an acupuncture facility than in a congregation of the faithful belting out “Onward Christian Soldiers”, but the Supreme Court majority didn’t take the point.*

Having concluded that the law was not neutral, the majority then applied “strict scrutiny”: a standard of constitutional scrutiny that requires the government to prove that the law is “narrowly tailored” to serve a “compelling” state interest.

The majority accepted that stemming the spread of Covid-19 is a compelling interest, but concluded that the regulations were not “narrowly tailored” because there was no evidence of Covid outbreaks among the applicants’ congregations.

What kind of body count would have provided satisfactory evidence, I wonder?

The majority also thought that less restrictive rules could be adopted to “minimize the risk to those attending religious services”, including by linking the maximum attendance at a religious service to the size of the church or synagogue. “[E]ven in a pandemic, the constitution cannot be put away and forgotten.  The restrictions at issue here, by effectively barring many from attending religious services, strike at the very heart of the First Amendment’s guarantee of religious liberty”, the majority wrote (p 5).

Justice Gorsuch and the protection of the public’s health

A feature of the opinions of the majority Justices is their relative lack of deference to the experience, competence or expertise of public health leaders in crafting pre-emptive measures to reduce Covid spread.

There is no recognition in any of the majority opinions that the risk of Covid spread in churches and other houses of worship, where singing or chanting takes place and where hundreds of people may huddle together, is any different from stores and shops, where people wear masks, and are not so tightly packed.

On p 3 of this concurring opinion, Justice Gorsuch pointedly criticised the 100 year-old case of Jacobson v Massachusetts.  This was a case in which the Supreme Court upheld the right of the State of Massachusetts to require people to be vaccinated for smallpox, or pay a fine.

Justice Gorsuch pointed out (pp 3-4) that courts will apply rational basis review as the standard of scrutiny in their constitutional review of State laws, provided that fundamental or constitutionally protected rights are not implicated.

[Rational basis review is a lower level of constitutional scrutiny.  To withstand rational basis review, the State must show that the State’s laws or actions are “rationally related” to a “legitimate” interest.]

However, Justice Gorsuch pointed out that religious activities must be treated “at least as well as comparable secular activities unless it can meet the demands of strict scrutiny” (p 4).

Justice Gorsuch (pp 5-6) goes on to criticise the opinion of Chief Justice Roberts, who dissented, and to surmise that the dissentients on the court wished “to stay out of the way in times of crisis”.

He continues: “[T]here is no world in which the Constitution tolerates color-coded executive edicts that reopen liquor stores and bike shops but shutter churches, synagogues, and mosques.”

Real world consequences

As at July 2021, New York State (population 20.4 million) has had 2.1 million Covid-19 cases, and nearly 54,000 deaths.

Australia (population 26 million) has had 31,000 cases and 910 deaths. With emerging SARS-CoV-2 variants, things could change quickly.

The US has certainly struggled – really struggled – to effectively control the spread of Covid-19, and the world has looked on.  The loss of life has been horrific, and extraordinary for such a wealthy, capable country.

Thoughtful commentary explores why: see, for example, here, here, here and here.

For lovers of democracy and human rights, America’s experience has been tragic in another respect: it adds heft to the narrative of autocrats and dictators that democratic government is ill-fitted to the challenges of the age.

What does make sense, in a democratic society where the rule of law operates, where elected officials are fulfilling the mandate granted by voters, is for them to be afforded a measure of deference – of operational space – to design instruments that prevent disease transmission and loss of life, in an environment that remains substantially uncertain.

If strict scrutiny is ever used as a weapon to paralyse government during a public health emergency, it will come at a price.

Why? Because swift and decisive government action to stamp out outbreaks of lethal variants is the key to saving lives, at least in countries where substantial numbers of the population remain unvaccinated. Viruses don’t care about human rights, and they never went to Law School. They don’t care if you are sincere in your beliefs or if you “truly believe”. They just jump from person to person when you get too close.

Ironically, when government does get it right, and no one dies, it all suddenly starts to look like overkill.

In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts stated that: “[I]t is a significant matter to override determinations made by public health officials concerning what is necessary for public safety in the midst of a deadly pandemic”.

His Honour wrote: “I do not regard my dissenting colleagues as “cutting the Constitution lose during a pandemic” or “shelter[ing] in place when the Constitution is under attack”.

Chief Justice Roberts then paraphrased Jacobson v Massachusetts (197 U.S. 11 (1905), 38, writing that “[o]ur Constitution principally entrusts [t]he safety and the health of the people to the politically accountable officials of the States to ‘guard and protect’.

It’s not clear, he says, which part of this phrase is so discomfiting to the majority justices.

Justice Breyer, in dissent, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, expressed similar sentiments (p 27/33).

What does seem clear, when you read the Cuomo decision, is that the new majority on the US Supreme Court will be far less likely to defer to expert opinion (however well founded) or to politically accountable State officials when it comes to scrutinising emergency regulations. It doesn’t bode well for elected officials seeking to discharge the one public duty that most libertarians would grudgingly concede: keeping the body count down during outbreaks of a deadly, contagious disease.

*Indeed, congregational singing was an interesting footnote in a subsequent case in which the Supreme Court struck down a Californian ban on indoor worship services. In South Bay United Pentecostal Church v Newsom, Justice Gorsuch wrote: “Of course we are not scientists, but….[e]ven in times of crisis – perhaps especially in times of crisis – we have a duty to hold governments to the Constitution” (p 5/15). It was left to Justice Kagan, dissenting with Justices Breyer and Sotomayor, to respond: “Justices of this court are not scientists. Nor do we know much about public health policy. Yet today the Court displaces the judgments of experts about how to respond to a raging epidemic. The court orders California to weaken its restrictions on public gatherings by making a special exception for worship services….Under the Court’s injunction, the State must instead treat worship services like secular activities that pose a much lesser danger…” (p 10/15).

Sydney Law School will be offering Critical Issues in Public Health Law, a postgraduate unit that explores Australian and international responses to infectious disease, as part of its Master of Health Law, in semester 1, 2022. See here or here for more information.

Freedom to protest, public health, and Covid-19

Update: the podcast of the event described below is now available, click here.

Recently, a number of protests have taken place on the grounds of The University of Sydney against Commonwealth government education policies.  See, for example, here (28 August) and here (14 October).

During the latter protest, police were filmed throwing a demonstrator heavily onto concrete (see here: https://twitter.com/honi_soit/status/1316224862889754624, while in this footage (https://twitter.com/honi_soit/status/1316223965568749568), my colleague Professor Simon Rice, the Kim Santow Chair of Law Reform and Social Justice at Sydney Law School, was pushed to the ground, arrested, and issued with a fine.

“It was violent without causing any particular harm”, he told The Guardian. “Disproportionate force, completely unjustified.”  See also here.

Ironically, Simon and I had just been discussing the tension between civil liberties and public health in the context of policing of earlier demonstrations.

Simon will be appearing as a member of a panel discussing these issues in a seminar entitled Protest in a Time of Pandemic, convened by the School of Social and Political Sciences in the Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences, University of Sydney, together with, Sydney Law School, Sydney Institute of Criminology, and Sydney Health Law.

Other Panel members include: Felicity Graham, Taylah Gray, Georgia Carr, Professor Danielle Celermajer and the author.

This is a live online event: Fri 13 November 2020, 11.00-12:30AEDT. See here for details and to register.

This seminar explores whether there is a right to protest during a pandemic, the tension between freedom and the policing of lockdown and social distancing measures, and the forms that protest might take in a liberal society.


Rule of law in the Covid-19 response

The International Development Law Organisation (IDLO) has released a short publication that highlights the role of law in governments’ response to Covid-19.  See here.

Established by international treaty in 1988, IDLO is an inter-governmental organisation devoted to upholding the rule of law.  Australia, and the United States, are among its 37 member parties, which span both developed and developing countries.

IDLO works in over 30 countries and across a range of legally-relevant areas, including public health, sustainability, access to justice, the rule of law and gender.

Sydney Law School collaborated with IDLO, the World Health Organisation and the O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University in the 2017 publication, Advancing the right to health: the vital role of law.  An update and summary guide to the report was published in 2018, see here.

The vital role of law in the Covid-19 response identifies a number of lessons that both publications have for law’s role in the current coronavirus pandemic.

Covid-19 and the rule of law

A statement by IDLO’s Director-General, Jan Beagle, also draws attention to how the rule of law can contribute to an effective global response to Covid-19.

The rule of law is the principle that law-making processes should be transparent, laws should be enforced fairly, courts and tribunals should be independent, and the administration of law and its substantive content should be consistent with international human rights standards (see here, p 7).

Director-General Beagle draws attention, firstly, to the way that the rule of law and the justice sector can temper raw political responses to epidemics, allowing “carefully tailored” emergency measures that “protect people from infection and disease, while respecting their civil, political, economic and social rights”.

For example, where legal or executive processes are used to create “disproportionately excessive powers”, international human rights law, and legal instruments such as the International Health Regulations, provide standards for restoring balance.

Secondly, Director-General Beagle points out that the rule of law “can be a lifeline for society’s most vulnerable in times of crisis.  She writes:

“When freedom of movement is restricted and resources are scarce, feelings of stress, anxiety and alienation can exacerbate exclusion, discrimination and social fissures and have a disproportionate impact on people living in extreme poverty, women and girls, the elderly, children, people with disabilities, migrants, refugees and displaced persons, prisoners, and those living in situations of conflict and insecurity”.

Evidence of these social fissures is seen, for example, in rising rates of family and domestic violence since Covid-19 began, particularly against women and children.  See here, here and here.  UN Women calls this a “shadow pandemic”.

At times like this, the role of justice institutions and the rule of law is more important than ever to “protect the rights of the least powerful among us”.

Finally, Director-General Beagle refers to the rule of law in providing “concrete pathways for post-emergency recovery”, including by addressing the “socio-economic consequences of the epidemic”.

“This will require greater investments in public institutions and inclusive and participatory policymaking to help communities to come together and maintain social cohesion in the aftermath of this pandemic”.

Law’s mission in public health

Although commenting specifically on the rule of law, Director-General Beagle’s statement helps to identify some key features of the mission that law can have – in my view ought to have – within the arena of public health.

Law is a tool that can be used for deploying, but also constraining, political power.  Wisely used, it can create an effective legal framework for health protection that is led by government, and informed by human rights.

However, in fulfilling its role in health protection, law’s role is not – or should not only be – to improve health “on average”, but to help tackle the factors that drive inequalities in health: the deep pools of disadvantage that persist even when average health improves.  Health law work is certainly about improving average health, but it’s also about effective health protection for those who will be left behind – or trampled underfoot – if all we care about is the law of averages.  A growing literature is beginning to document the social gradient of Covid-19 transmission, in the sense that economic and social disparities can amplify virus transmission, just as they amplify risks and poor health outcomes in other areas.

Finally, in speaking of law’s role in supporting “the resilience of communities against future crises”, Director-General Beagle also draws attention to the future dimensions of public health law.  The purpose of public health law is not only to secure the present, but to create legal frameworks that will help to give future generations the opportunity to enjoy a healthy life.

Law’s mission in public health is ambitious, and the rule of law is a critical part of that mission.  With Covid-19, global warming, and persistent epidemics of non-communicable diseases (and their risk factors) such as cancer, diabetes, and obesity, the need for health law specialists has never been greater.

Are you interested in studying health law?  Click here, here and here for more details.

International Guidelines on Human Rights, Healthy Diets and Sustainable Food Systems: could they make a difference?

The BMJ has published an Opinion calling on the Director-General of the World Health Organisation, Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Dr Michelle Bachelet, to jointly initiate a process to develop International Guidelines on Human Rights, Healthy Diets, and Sustainable Food Systems.

180 signatories from 38 countries have supported this Open Call – experts in global health and development, human rights, food systems, and HIV.

You can join the Call and add your name in support here, at the Healthy Societies 2030 website.

Healthy Societies is also hosting supporting documents, including a suggested process for strengthening links between human rights and healthy diets at the global level, and moving towards international guidelines.  (You can contribute to the discussion form, follow on twitter, and join the mailing list).

But pausing for a moment.

How would International Guidelines on human rights and healthy diets make a difference?

The Open Call published in BMJ draws on the example of the International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights (1998), which clarified the legal obligation of States, under international law, to respect, protect and fulfill human rights in the context of HIV.

These Guidelines helped to consolidate the framing of global strategy for HIV prevention and treatment in terms of the human rights of those affected by HIV.

And they provided language and conceptual tools for civil society organisations to hold governments to account.

In the BMJ Opinion, we argue that joint WHO/OHCHR guidelines could have a similar effect, by putting people at the centre of food systems, and strengthening the protection of health in global and national policies.

 

Framing global strategy effectively: the example of HIV

Getting global strategies right matters because they affect national strategies, actions and budgets.

These days, human rights are at the centre of the global response to HIV.

A focus on human dignity, preventing discrimination, empowering those with, or at risk of HIV, and ensuring that no one is left behind – these human rights values lie at the core of global strategies to prevent transmission and treat infection.

It wasn’t always that way.

In Australia, in the 1980s and early 1990s, public debate about rising rates of HIV infection was often framed by prejudice and fear.

HIV was the “gay plague”.  As a PhD student, I remember seeing a call by the Queensland Association of Catholic Parents to brand homosexuals in order to “stop AIDS”.

In Australia at that time, otherwise sane people were arguing that everyone in the country should be tested for HIV, and those with HIV should be removed from society or quarantined in the desert somewhere.

Fortunately, a kinder, more rational and humane approach – a human rights approach – prevailed.

By working with and through those affected by HIV – rather than against them – HIV rates have remained low in Australia.

It didn’t happen by accident.  It took a great deal of effort to ensure that national strategy was framed in such a way as to make it effective.

(The Honourable Michael Kirby, a former Justice of the High Court, and tireless advocate for a human rights approach to HIV – especially during the critical decades of the 1980s and 1990s – is one of the signatories to this Open Call).

 

Why a human rights frame for healthy diets and sustainable food systems?

So human rights have played an honourable role in the global response to HIV.

But how could they have a similar positive impact on nutrition, diet, and health around the world?

Some of the most urgent public health problems today revolve around the interlinked crises of obesity, poor nutrition, hunger, and climate change.

The starting point is that in many countries, market forces are failing to deliver healthy diets, adequate nutrition and sustainable food systems.

If framing food purely as a commodity, and if framing food systems purely as business networks supplying commodities in response to market demand – was effective, then countries wouldn’t be buckling under the strain of a massive, preventable burden of diabetes, obesity and chronic, diet-related diseases.

The Lancet Commission on Obesity called for “a radical rethink of business models, food systems, civil society involvement, and national and international governance” to address these problems.

While many actions will need to be taken, the BMJ Opinion argues that human rights concepts and language are powerful, under-used tools.

Interested in supporting breast-feeding, and preventing the predatory corporate practices that undermine it?  Try doing that without the moral support of human rights concepts.

Interested in the quality of food and drinks served in schools?  Or the stealth marketing of unhealthy foods and drinks to children using online platforms?  You could, of course, revert to the well-worn concepts of parental responsibility and consumer choice.  How’s that working out?

International human rights law provides a powerful way to frame these, and other challenges.

States owe an obligation to respect, protect and fulfil the right to health, as recognised in Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

Amongst other things, this requires States to protect the right to health from interference by others, including corporations pursuing economic interests without reference to the impact on health or the environment.

Joint WHO/OHCHR guidelines could help to push human rights concepts and language beyond the “UN human rights silo”.

The subtle form of forum sharing and coalition building that we advocate, through joint WHO/OHCHR guidelines, is increasingly recognised in other areas of the global health response, such as the Global Strategy to Accelerate Tobacco Control (2019), adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.

Many new ideas appear surprising at first glance.  And action at the global level may appear indirect, and abstracted from reality.

However, International Guidelines on human rights and healthy diets could help to mobilize multisectoral action, strengthen the accountability of States and the private sector, and deepen community engagement in the urgent task of developing healthier, fairer and sustainable food systems.

Let’s leave no one behind.

You can join the Open Call on Dr Tedros and Dr Bachelet here.

 

 

Medical treatment in the best interests of the child: onshore, and offshore

There are troubling disparities between the medical treatment that children receive, depending on whether they live onshore – in Australia, or offshore – in immigration detention in places like Nauru.  But do these disparities have a legal basis?

Medical treatment and the best interests of the child: onshore

Exercising their parens patriae jurisdiction, Australian Supreme Courts will intervene – paternalistically, and unapologetically – to ensure that children receive the medical treatment that is in their best interests.

In many circumstances this means granting orders to authorise medical treatment so that Australian children don’t die.

Although the context is very different, recent cases in NSW and Victoria involving the administration of blood products to Jehovah’s Witnesses illustrate the point.

In Sydney Children’s Hospital Network, The Application of [2018] NSWSC 1259, the Supreme Court of NSW authorised the administration of blood products during open heart surgery that the court expected an unborn baby would require following birth.  The pregnant woman was a Jehovah’s Witness who had prospectively refused to allow her child to receive blood.

In a similar case held a few weeks later, the Supreme Court authorised a blood transfusion, if necessary, during surgery on a 6 year-old to remove a tumour.

In Mercy Hospitals Victoria v D1 & Anor [2018] VSC 519, the court order cleared the way for a blood transfusion to be given to a 17 year-old pregnant girl if she haemorrhaged following birth.

People may disagree about the merits of compelling a Jehovah’s Witness teenager to accept a blood transfusion, but the point is that courts have jealously guarded the scope of the parens patriae jurisdiction, and it survives intact to ensure that children in Australia receive medical treatment when it is in their best interests to do so.

Medical treatment and the best interests of the child: offshore

A consensus seems to have arisen among many Australians that treating children poorly and neglecting their physical and psychological needs is the price to be paid for “stopping the boats” and preventing asylum seekers from “jumping the queue”.

This issue has become highly politicised.

Politicians flash border protection pectorals, and many Australians respond positively.

But do Australians really want children to be neglected, and denied medical treatment?

Because that’s what’s been happening for many years, and it’s set to happen again if the “Medevac Bill” (the Home Affairs legislation Amendment (Miscellaneous Measures) Act 2019 is repealed.

Before considering this legislation, let’s pick a case study, but take our facts – not from the Minister’s office, but from an institution in our democracy that should and must remain apolitical: the courts.

Rowena’s story

“Rowena” (a pseudonym) is a young girl; we don’t know her age but we know she is not yet a teenager.

Her parents fled their country of origin, and travelled to Christmas Island by boat.  They arrived in 2013, thereby becoming “unauthorised maritime arrivals” under Australia’s Migration Act 1958.

Under section 198AD, they were transferred to Nauru, a country of 21 sq km that assesses asylum seekers who wish to settle in Australia, pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding between both governments.

The Australian Government pays all the costs of assessing and housing asylum seekers.

These accommodation precincts (whatever you want to call them) would not exist if they were not a manifestation of Australian government policy.

In 2014, Rowena’s parents were assessed as refugees under the Refugee Convention and granted temporary settlement visas in Nauru.

However, Rowena and her parents were not permitted to settle in Australia.  Unless they chose to return to their home country, they were obliged to remain indefinitely on Nauru, or until a third country agreed to settle them.

Around March 2017, Rowena’s parents separated, and her father went to live with his new girlfriend.

Rowena’s mental health began to deteriorate around April that year.

In October 2017, Rowena told a child psychologist employed by International Health and Medical Services (IHMS, a health services contractor), that a voice tells her that “dying is better than living, you’ll be free”.

Rowena told the child psychologist that “she wants to die and she wants to kill herself and that if she was going to kill herself she could ‘make myself lost in the jungle and put a knife in my stomach’”.

In December 2017, Rowena attempted suicide by taking 14 tablets of her mother’s medication.  She was admitted to hospital with respiratory distress, chest and abdominal pain.

Three days later, a counsellor employed by IHMS wrote in the clinical notes that Rowena said: “The medication didn’t kill me, I will try something else”.  “I will kill myself with a knife or jump off the rocks”.

Rowena told the counsellor that she knew how to kill herself because she “has seen in the movies people stabbing themselves with knives”.

She told the counsellor that “attempting suicide made her feel good”.

A psychiatrist employed by IHMS wrote:

“It was clear that this bright child was a little confused on what it meant to be dead.  She was persistent in her thought of wanting to die and leave this world but it was not quite synonymous with her intent to kill herself.  She interspersed the theme of wanting to die with hopes of leaving Nauru and starting a new life elsewhere”.

Rowena’s mother began sleeping in the same room as Rowena for fear she might commit suicide.

However, on 18 December 2017, Rowena ran away from her mother and according to an affidavit by Professor Louise Newman, a child psychiatrist and Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Melbourne, “was found in a position to jump from a height and said that a voice was telling her to jump, jump, jump”.

Professor Newman concluded that there was “clearly an immediate risk” that Rowena would engage in further suicidal behaviour.

Rowena required, in her opinion, treatment by specialists qualified in child psychiatry “in an inpatient child mental health facility with appropriate supervision”.

On 20 December, Rowena and her mother were transferred to the Restricted Accommodation Area within the Regional Processing Centre on Nauru.

According to Professor Newman, this was not an adequate response.

Professor Newman wrote: “Supervision is essential as this child has now run away on two separate occasions and is experiencing command hallucinations urging her to suicide”.

In Professor Newman’s opinion, Rowena needed a safe environment where she could live with her mother and sister, “supported by trained child and adolescent mental health staff on a 24 hour basis”.

Nauru does not provide such facilities.

Rowena v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

Rowena’s circumstances came before Justice Murphy in the Federal Court in February 2018.

According to evidence in that case, a panel called the “Overseas Medical Referral” Committee, based in Nauru, was required to approve all medical transfers, in conjunction with Australian Border Force officials.

According to evidence given by a GP who had previously worked for IHMS on Nauru, the Overseas Medical Committee was erratic and poorly administered, and the medical transfer system “inefficient and driven by political and not medical concerns”.

After multiple attempts to obtain authorisation from the Commonwealth, IHMS, and others to transfer Rowena from Nauru, Rowena, through her litigation representative, sought an injunction requiring the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to transfer her to a specialist child mental health facility that could provide the comprehensive psychiatric care recommended by specialists.

The basis for her case was that the Australian Government (the Commonwealth) owed her a duty of care which it had breached, and continued to breach, by “failing to provide her with access to safe and appropriate medical facilities and treatment”.

As Murphy J stated, “The application essentially alleges a continuing tort”.

The Court considered whether there was an arguable case that the Commonwealth owed Rowena a duty of care, applying well-known “salient features” identified in Caltex Refinieries (Qld) Pty Ltd v Stavar [2009] NSWCA 258, [102]-[103].

The Commonwealth conceded that there was a serious question to be tried, but argued that Rowena’s psychiatric problems could be adequately treated on Nauru, despite there being no child psychiatrist stationed in Nauru, and no specialist child mental health facility there.

[As an aside, the Commonwealth’s concession followed a judgment by Bromberg J in the Federal Court in a well-known 2016 case involving an African woman who, while on Nauru, was raped while she was unconscious and suffering a seizure (likely caused by epilepsy).  The Minister for Immigration, Peter Dutton, refused to transfer the woman from Nauru to Australia for the purposes of having an abortion.  He was, however, willing to fly her to Papua New Guinea, where abortion was illegal and could expose her to criminal liability.

In that case, the Minister denied any duty of care to the pregnant woman.  The Federal Court decided that the Minister did owe her a duty of care which required him to “procure for her a safe and lawful abortion”.  The discharge of the Minister’s duty of care did not require the woman to be brought to Australia.  However, the duty was not discharged by arranging for the abortion in PNG.]

Does the Australian Government owe children and adolescents in immigration detention a duty of care?

In Rowena’s case, Murphy J concluded that:

“I am disinclined to accept that outpatient treatment coupled with a child psychiatrist visiting every few months (or even every month) will provide the mental health care treatment the applicant needs and adequately protect her in relation to the risk of suicide.  I do not consider that the OMR [Overseas Medical Referral] process is adequate or likely to be sufficiently swift to adequately protect against the risk of suicide”.

Murphy J found that the balance of convenience favoured the injunction, and ordered the Commonwealth to “remove [Rowena] from Nauru and place her in a specialist child mental health facility with the capacity to perform a comprehensive tertiary level child psychiatric assessment, in accordance with Professor Newman’s recommendations”.

Rowena’s story is not unique

Similar cases involving sick and suicidal children are reported:

  • here (suicidal 10 year-old boy)
  • here (suicidal 17 year-old boy), and
  • here (adolescent girl who had cut herself, refused food and water and would soon require nasogastric feeding).

In another case, the Commonwealth sought to exclude entry of a two year-old girl with herpes encephalitis, a “serious and life-threatening neurological condition”, arguing (against the evidence of IHMS and consultant specialists) that she could be appropriately treated at the Pacific International Hospital in Papua New Guinea.

What a joy it must be to act for the Minister in these cases: seeking to use the law to deny children urgently needed medical and psychiatric treatment.

In each of these cases, it was Australian courts that provided a measure of decency, compelling the Minister to do what he would otherwise refuse to do: provide a reasonable level of care to children suffering (mostly) psychiatric trauma caused or aggravated by the circumstances of their detention offshore.

Another shared feature of these cases is that the Commonwealth has been forced to concede that there is an arguable case that they owe each of these children a duty of care.

This makes sense.  After all, these children’s daily lives are framed – if not dominated – by Australian government policy.

They depend on the Minister for Home Affairs (previously called the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection) for food, shelter, security and health care.

As Ben Doherty writes, it’s only when these cases get to court that humanity prevails.  Until that time, officials from the Department of Home Affairs delay as long as they can, apparently to please their political masters.

The “Medevac Bill”

In February 2019, against the wishes of the Morrison government, the Commonwealth Parliament passed the “Medevac Bill”.

The Act required the Secretary to identify so-called “legacy minors” (persons aged under 18 years held in a regional processing country as at 1 March 2019), and required the Minister to either approve or refuse the transfer of each legacy minor to Australia within 72 hours after being notified.

Under the legislation, the transfer of minors to Australia is [was] automatic unless the Minister reasonably suspected (on advice from ASIO) that the transfer would be prejudicial to security or that the person has a substantial criminal record (s 198D).

The Act also provides for the transfer to Australia of “relevant transitory persons” where two or more treating doctors form the opinion that the person requires medical or psychiatric treatment that cannot be provided by the regional processing country.

Again, the Minister is taken to have approved their transfer unless, within 72 hours, the Minister intervenes on the basis that [he] reasonably believes that appropriate medical or psychiatric treatment can be provided without their transfer, or that the transfer would be prejudicial to security, or that the person has a substantial criminal record (s 198E).

The Minister’s decision can be appealed to the Independent Health Advice Panel, comprised of independent and Australian government doctors (see s 199B), who can over-rule the Minister about whether the person’s transfer to Australia is necessary in order to provide them with appropriate medical or psychiatric treatment (s 198F).

The legislation also provides that family members of a legacy minor, family members of a transitory person, and other persons recommended by the treating doctor to accompany a transitory person – may be transferred to Australia, unless the Minister intervenes within 72 hours on the grounds above (ss 198C, 198G).

Where the Minister does intervene, [he] must table a statement before Parliament explaining [his] reasons (s 198J).

Thirty-one transfers to mainland Australia have occurred since the Act became effective.  Of nine transfers rejected by the Minister, two were overturned by the Independent Health Advice Panel.

What’s at stake?

The Australian Government opposed the Medevac Bill because it took medical transfers out of the hands of the Minister for Home Affairs, Peter Dutton, substituting an independent medical process.

Following the decisive victory of the Morrison government in the 2019 federal election (18 May 2019), the Home Affairs Minister has stated the Medevac Bill should be repealed in its entirety.

Labor Senator Kristina Keneally has not ruled out considering amendments, but stated that the Act “provides a way for people who are sick to get the care they need and ensures the Minister has final discretion as to who can come”.

Asylum seeker policy will continue to be controversial.

Children, however, are not responsible for the fact of their detention, and should not be conscripted into the endless – and merciless – politics of Australia’s immigration debate.

Denying children – or for that matter, adults – appropriate medical and psychiatric care is miserably cruel.

Politicians who have supported and enabled the denial of medical treatment to children do not represent the values of Australia.  You do not speak for us.

I cannot help thinking that we can learn something here from the common law method.

As every law student learns, courts – conventionally, at least – seek to apply existing principles and to develop them modestly, where necessary, but to avoid making sweeping pronouncements that extend too far beyond what is necessary to reach an appropriate decision.

Perhaps Australian politicians, too, whatever their beliefs about offshore detention, should take an incremental step towards compassion, and do the right thing in the case at hand, granting the children of asylum seekers medical and psychiatric care of the same standard they would want their own children to receive, instead of visiting the sins of the parents upon them.

Are you interested in studying health and medical law?  Sydney Law School offers a Master of Health Law and Graduate Diploma in Health Law.  See also here, and here.

 

Trump: the war on breastfeeding

The New York Times reports that US officials threatened to unleash trade sanctions and withdraw military aid from Ecuador unless it withdrew a resolution at May’s World Health Assembly calling on governments to “protect, promote and support breast-feeding”.

The article is worth reading in its entirety.

As the father of a currently breastfeeding infant, I find this kind of behaviour utterly repellent.

There are echoes of Right to Health language (respect, protect, fulfil) in the resolution which might have displeased the Americans, but the real motivator was American support for large corporate manufacturers of breast-milk substitutes.

(Like Chicago-based Abbott Laboratories.)

Ecuador backed off from the offending resolution, as did “at least a dozen other countries, most of them poor nations in Africa and Latin America”.

Then Russia stepped in, and the intimidation apparently stopped.

“We’re not trying to be a hero here”, said a Russian delegate to the World Health Assembly, “but we feel that it is wrong when a big country tries to push around some very small countries, especially on an issue that is really important for the rest of the world.”

Plenty of ironies here.  But they have a point.

According to the New York Times report, a Department of Health and Human Services spokesperson said: “The resolution as originally drafted placed unnecessary hurdles for mothers seeking to provide nutrition to their children.  We recognize not all women are able to breast-feed for a variety of reasons. These women should have the choice and access to alternatives for the health of their babies, and not be stigmatized for the ways in which they are able to do so.”

Well gosh, that ought to sort out the doubters.

The Lancet reports that scaling up breast-feeding to near universal levels could avoid 823,000 deaths of children under 5 each year, and 20,000 maternal deaths from breast cancer.

Breastfeeding protects both mother and child, and it’s free, which is important if you’re poor.

Yet for billion dollar formula companies, the temptation to monetise the act of feeding by targeting young mothers, is just irresistible.

Read the Guardian’s investigation into Nestle’s marketing practices flogging formula to poor women in central Manila here.  Then weep.

Here is the resolution that eventually passed in the World Health Assembly, with American support.

Amongst other things, it requests the WHO Director-General to provide, upon request, “technical support to Member States to establish, review and implement national laws, policies and programmes to support infant and young child feeding”.

However, US hostility scuttled language that would have called on WHO to provide “technical support to member states seeking to halt “inappropriate promotion of foods for infants and young children.”

“Inappropriate” in this context would refer to the promotion of foods in contravention of the International Code of Conduct of Breast-milk Substitutes.

The Code prohibits the advertising of infant formula and other breast-milk substitutes to the general public, to pregnant women and mothers, and to health workers who are concerned with infant and maternal nutrition.  It also prohibits the giving of samples and other incentives for purchase. Governments are urged to implement the Code through national legislation, regulations or other suitable measures.

In addition, the Code states that infant formula should contain a clear statement of the superiority of breastfeeding, and a statement that the product should only be used following advice from a health worker. The container and labels should not contain pictures of infants, or include pictures or text that “may idealize the use of infant formula”.

Appropriately, the resolution does urge Member States (of the World Health Organisation) to strengthen national initiatives to implement the Code.

However, when you put it all together, it appears the Trump administration does not want sovereign countries receiving technical support from WHO about how best to frame their laws and policies to prevent predatory marketing practices that breach the Code.

It’s the Trump administration’s war on breastfeeding women.

Click here for information about the Australian Breastfeeding Association.

ANNOUNCEMENT: Sydney Law School and the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney are co-hosting an evening seminar entitled “Public health law and health leadership in the United States: What can Australia learn?” on 19 July 2018, 6.00-7.30pmClick here for the brochure and further details.  A separate post will follow about this event.

If you’re interested to learn more about law and non-communicable diseases, Sydney Law School is offering a Masters unit, “Law, Business & Healthy Lifestyles” in the coming semester.  Click here for more information.

Advancing the Right to Health: the Vital Role of Law

N0032287 Group portrait of seven boys, Ethiopia

More than 20 years ago, Chris Reynolds, an Australian pioneer in our understanding of public health law, wrote that: “law is a powerful tool, as potent as any of the medical technologies available to treat disease”, and yet “our understanding of the potential of [public health law]…to help…citizens to lead longer and healthier lives, is not well developed”. (Reynolds, “The Promise of Public Health Law” (1994) 1 JLM 212).

A new report entitled Advancing the Right to Health: the Vital Role of Law, published last week by the World Health Organisation, illustrates just how central law is to our health and wellbeing.

The full report, and each of its chapters, can be downloaded (free of charge) here.

brochure_final_print-high-resolution_page_1

Law a powerful tool for improving public health…everywhere

Countries around the world are using law and legislation across a broad range of areas to protect the health of their populations.

These areas include communicable and contagious diseases, and public health emergencies, maternal and child health, sanitation, water and vector control, the prevention of non-communicable diseases and their risk factors (such as tobacco, alcohol and obesity), prevention of violence and injuries, not to mention essential medicines and universal health coverage, and the regulatory challenges of strengthening health systems.

In each of these areas countries have a great deal to learn from each other.

One benefit of taking a global perspective on public health law is that you get a better sense how the field is buzzing with innovation.

For every jurisdiction where political will is lacking, there’s another that is trying out the new, whether at national, state, or local/city level.

Take legal responses to dietary risks as an example:

Even when new legislative proposals are adopted or accepted, they nevertheless illustrate new ways of addressing health risks, and possible future directions.

One example is the Sugar-Sweetened Beverages Safety Warning Bill introduced for three consecutive years into California’s legislature, which would have required sugar-sweetened beverages and vending machines to carry the warning: STATE OF CALIFORNIA SAFETY WARNING: Drinking beverages with added sugar(s) contributes to obesity, diabetes, and tooth decay.”

This proposal has not yet been successful in California.  However, San Francisco has passed a local ordinance requiring the same warning, although it is now subject to litigation.

N0032285 Group portrait of seven boys, Ethiopia

Sydney Health Law…partnering with WHO, IDLO and the O’Neill Institute

Advancing the right to health is the result of a collaboration between Sydney Law School’s health law program, the O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University, the International Development Law Organisation (IDLO) and the World Health Organisation.

The key message from this report is that there is enormous, untapped potential for governments to use law more effectively to reduce health risks and to make communities healthier and more resilient.

The report provides guidance about issues and requirements to be addressed during the process of developing public health laws, with case studies drawn from countries around the world to illustrate effective law reform practices and critical features of effective public health legislation.

Advancing the Right to Health: The Vital Role of Law was launched at the Graduate Institute in Geneva by Dr Marie-Paule Kieny, Assistant Director-General, Health Systems and Innovation, WHO.  WHO’s feature on the report is available here.

For comments made by Mr David Patterson, Senior Legal Expert – Health, International Development Law Organisation, see here.

For comments made at the launch by Professor Roger Magnusson, principal author of the report, on the connections between public health law and universal health coverage, see the following link: roger-magnusson-comments-at-launch-of-report-advancing-the-right-to-health-16-jan-2017

Are you interested in studying health law?  Sydney Law School’s Graduate Diploma in Health Law, and Master of Health Law are open to both lawyers and non-lawyers.  For further information, click here.  For information on Sydney Health Law, the Centre for Health Law at Sydney Law School, click here.

N0032286 Group portrait of seven boys, Ethiopia
N0032286 Group portrait of seven boys, Ethiopia

It’s time for the government to stop shooting the messenger

The constant attacks on Professor Gillian Triggs represent attacks on the human rights and civil liberties that Australians value. Since 1986, the Human Rights Commission has been the watchdog for human rights for Australia.  The President and her Commissioners are necessarily independent of government and have a duty to fearlessly advocate for human rights protections and to criticise laws and policies that undermine the rights and freedoms Australians enjoy.

The current barrage of orchestrated attacks on Triggs is supposedly on the basis that her comments are politically motivated. Of course they are. Human rights lie at the core of our political system: they require government to protect their population and provide a political environment in which they can flourish. If human rights weren’t political they would make no sense at all.  The problem for the government is that it wants to ignore human rights yet remain immune from criticism.

The real criticism of Triggs is that she has been biased and is playing party politics. This is an absolute furphy. Party politics is about contested concepts but no one can contest the evidence of abuse of human rights that were raised in the Commission’s report. The timing of the report is irrelevant. What we need is a response from government that explains what has been happening and what will be done to protect the vulnerable children and adults that we are detaining. Instead the government’s response have been to shoot the messenger, call for her resignation and criminalise the release of further information about the detention of asylum seekers.

The government’s treatment of children in detention deserves particular censure, and in time may appropriately become the subject of a Royal Commission.  Children in detention are vulnerable and voiceless.  As fathers we are appalled by the failure of the government to provide minimum conditions for their safety and welfare.  Yet because the abuse is happening behind barricades, under secrecy, and in the name of national security, accountability is lacking.  If our politicians lack the parental instincts and moral convictions to take steps to protect children from harm, then we call on parents everywhere to hold them to account.  This goes beyond political differences.

The true strength of conservatism is its adherence and protection of our basic political institutions, particularly civil liberties, ministerial responsible government and the rule of law. Another important principle is that the Attorney General, as first law officer, should protect the officers that make that legal system work (like the President of the Human Rights Commission). A further traditional convention is for the Speaker of the House to stay out of political debate.

The government has turned its back on all of these bedrock principles of Australian politics. Minister Dutton’s refusal to engage with the report in any meaningful sense mocks the principle of ministerial responsibility. The Attorney General’s treatment of Triggs in and outside of parliament shows a complete dereliction of his duty. Speaker Bronwyn Bishop‘s criticism of Triggs as being biased on Q&A was bitterly ironic given her record breaking performance in Parliament. Given its complete abandonment of traditional values, this government no longer can call itself conservative.

The only reasonable criticism of Gillian Triggs that can be made is that she is doing her job too well. Moreover, she is the only one actually doing her job. Rather than question her position, we need to ask how much of the traditional architecture of responsible democracy this government is prepared to trash to get its own way. It is time for the government to return to the traditional values of Australian government before the damage done to the polity becomes irreversible.

 

Cameron is Professor of Health, Law and Ethics at Sydney Law School

Roger is Professor of Health Law and Governance at Sydney Law School

Ian Kerridge is an Associate Professor at the Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in Medicine