Freedom to protest, public health, and Covid-19

Update: the podcast of the event described below is now available, click here.

Recently, a number of protests have taken place on the grounds of The University of Sydney against Commonwealth government education policies.  See, for example, here (28 August) and here (14 October).

During the latter protest, police were filmed throwing a demonstrator heavily onto concrete (see here: https://twitter.com/honi_soit/status/1316224862889754624, while in this footage (https://twitter.com/honi_soit/status/1316223965568749568), my colleague Professor Simon Rice, the Kim Santow Chair of Law Reform and Social Justice at Sydney Law School, was pushed to the ground, arrested, and issued with a fine.

“It was violent without causing any particular harm”, he told The Guardian. “Disproportionate force, completely unjustified.”  See also here.

Ironically, Simon and I had just been discussing the tension between civil liberties and public health in the context of policing of earlier demonstrations.

Simon will be appearing as a member of a panel discussing these issues in a seminar entitled Protest in a Time of Pandemic, convened by the School of Social and Political Sciences in the Faculty of Arts & Social Sciences, University of Sydney, together with, Sydney Law School, Sydney Institute of Criminology, and Sydney Health Law.

Other Panel members include: Felicity Graham, Taylah Gray, Georgia Carr, Professor Danielle Celermajer and the author.

This is a live online event: Fri 13 November 2020, 11.00-12:30AEDT. See here for details and to register.

This seminar explores whether there is a right to protest during a pandemic, the tension between freedom and the policing of lockdown and social distancing measures, and the forms that protest might take in a liberal society.


Who’s in control of Australia’s response to coronavirus? Part 2: Operational responses

For part 1 of this post, click here.

One reason why there is a measure of confusion about operational control during an outbreak of disease with pandemic potential is because of the different functions and responsibilities of the Commonwealth, and the States within a federation.

For example, even if the (modest) number of cases meant that an outbreak could be comfortably handled as a jurisdictional health challenge, the fact remains that early cases are likely to be imported into Australia, and border control is a Commonwealth responsibility (see eg the “National CD Plan”, pp 8-12).

Similarly, sharing information with WHO about cases of covid-19 (a declared public health emergency of international concern) is both an obligation under the International Health Regulations and a Commonwealth function, via the National Focal Point (as to which see National Health Security Act 2007 (Cth) s 10).

It might be helpful to think about the escalation of government responses to a disease outbreak in terms of the following stages:

Although an outbreak may begin as a jurisdictional health challenge, the Commonwealth may become involved in coordinating and supporting the State/Territory response where there are “Communicable Disease Incidents of National Significance”.

As shown below, Commonwealth involvement may involve an escalation of governance arrangements in order to ensure a coordinated health sector response, or, in addition, to ensure a broader national response extending beyond the health sector requiring leadership at the highest political levels.  This is shown below.

[Source: Emergency Response Plan for Communicable Disease Incidents of National Significance: National Arrangements (“National CD Plan”) p 4]

 

A national health sector emergency

The distinctions set out above help us to understand the significance of the Australian Health Sector Emergency Response Plan for Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19), published on 18 February.

The “Coronavirus Emergency Response Plan” signals the existence of a national health sector emergency, based on anticipation of the potential for significant cases of community transmission to put pressure on State and Territory health systems.

The Prime Minister announced the implementation of the “Coronavirus Emergency Response Plan” on 27 February, triggered by advice that the world would shortly enter the pandemic phase of covid-19.

The Plan explains the division of responsibilities between the Australian government, and the States and Territories, with respect to planning, surveillance, clinical services, public health measures, research and planning, and communication.

The Australian Health Protection Principal Committee, which comprises State and Territory Chief Health Officers and is chaired by the Australian Chief Medical Officer, is the key decision-making committee, within the health bureaucracy, for health emergencies.  It is now meeting virtually daily and its statements on covid-19 are shown here.

In common with other plans, the Coronavirus Emergency Response Plan conceptualises the management of hazards in terms of a cycle of activities focused on: Prevention; Preparedness; Response; and Recovery.

Australia is currently in the response phase to the coronavirus (obviously).  This phase is usually divided into three further stages:

  • standby
  • action: initial action, and targeted action
  • stand down

The Plan identifies three scenarios: where clinical severity is low, moderate and high.  It also points out that progress through the stages above (eg from Initial action to Targeted action) is independent of “activation of whole-of-government or jurisdictional plans”.

 

An all-of-government response to a national health emergency

By 27 February, the day on which the Coronavirus Emergency Response Plan activated a nationally-coordinated health sector response, an all-of-government response to coronavirus was also emerging, through the National Security Committee and the Council of Australian Governments (COAG).

The Prime Minister explained the role that the Border Force Commissioner, and the Ministers for Education, Home Affairs and Treasury were taking in strengthening the national response.

The Health Minister explained that the focus of the national response was moving from containment to planning for a significant increase in cases of community transmission – by focusing on the sufficiency of the national medical stockpile and personal protective equipment, and the capacity of health personnel to manage a surge in cases and hospital admissions.

On 5 March, the Prime Minister revealed that the Australian Government had activated the National Coordination Mechanism, through the Department of Home Affairs: its role was to work with the states and territories to “co-ordinate the whole of government responses to issues outside the direct health management of COVID-19”.

Finance ministries now sit at the centre of Australia’s response to the coronavirus, attempting to mitigate the impact of sharp reductions in economic activity, spending and consumer confidence with first federal, and now state/territory stimulus packages.

The Commonwealth has also agreed to share the additional costs incurred by States and Territories in diagnosing and treating coronavirus patients, on a 50/50 basis.  (This National Partnership Agreement would operate from 21 January – the date that coronavirus became a Listed Human Disease under federal biosecurity laws).

The “National CD Plan”, which underlies these all-of-government efforts, was published in May 2018 and illustrates just how complex the response to “communicable disease incidents of national significance” really is.

On 13 March, the Prime Minister announced a “new National Cabinet, made up of the Prime Minister, Premiers and Chief Ministers” that will “meet at least weekly to address the country’s response to the coronavirus, COVID-19”.

This new cabinet will be advised by the Australian Health Protection Principal Committee (addressing health sector issues), and the National Coordination Mechanism convened by Home Affairs (addressing issues beyond the health sector).

Within the space of a few weeks, human coronavirus has gone from being a jurisdictional health challenge to precipitating new, creative cabinet structures to address its multi-sector impacts.

Who’s in control of Australia’s response to covid-19?  Currently, a “war cabinet” comprising the leaders of all Australian governments.

Who’s in control of Australia’s response to coronavirus? Part 1: Legal frameworks

The situation in Australia with human coronavirus is deteriorating.

454 cases so far, and 5 deaths, but cases are rising rapidly.  See here for updates.

Globally: 6,800 deaths and rising.

Australia’s Chief Medical Officer – Australia’s Director of Human Biosecurity – has advised the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) that gatherings of more than 500 people should be cancelled.

Social distancing measures are likely to be strengthened in future.

Anyone entering Australia must self-isolate for 14 days.

Universities like mine are migrating their teaching online, in order to support social distancing efforts.

So who is running Australia’s response to covid-19?

Usually, when a disease outbreak occurs, it is dealt with by States and Territories using their own processes and resources.

As the scale of the threat, or impact, of an outbreak increases, State/Territory actions may be supplemented by national coordination and resources, within – and beyond – the health sector.  State and federal Health Ministers may also formally declare a state of emergency, clearing the way for the exercise of potentially broad, executive, emergency powers.

Australia has robust operational plans and legislative frameworks for managing outbreaks.

But tracking government actions in terms of those plans, and relating actions back to the underlying legislative framework, is more difficult than it ought to be.

The distinctions between the various stages of the response are important because public health officials and political leaders may be exercising different legislative powers, and the public interests involved (including restrictions on civil liberties) will be balanced in different ways according to the scale of the threat and response.

Significant penalties may also be imposed for failure to comply.

Australia has a complex federal system.  In understanding Australia’s response to coranavirus, I think it helps to distinguish between the activation and escalation of operational plans and frameworks, and the activation and escalation of legal powers.

This is Part 1 of a two-part post.

Jurisdictional health challenge: public health legislation

States and Territories have primary responsibility for responding to disease outbreaks under the Public Health Acts (in NSW, the Public Health Act 2010, and its regulations).

Key state functions include investigating possible cases, contact tracing, collecting surveillance data, treating sick patients, and public communications.

As mentioned in a previous post, “Novel Coronavirus 2019” was scheduled under the Public Health Act 2010 (NSW) by executive order on 21 January.

This made covid-19 a reportable disease in NSW, both by medical practitioners and laboratories.  Persons with covid-19 must take precautions, they may be directed to undergo medical examination, and they may be subject to public health orders where their behaviour poses a risk to public health.

Distinct from declaring a public health emergency, the Public Health Act 2010 also gives the Health Minister a broad power to give directions to reduce risks to public health (s 7).

Consistent with advice from the Commonwealth Chief Medical officer (Dr Brendan Murphy), on 15 March the NSW Health Minister issued an executive order prohibiting major events that involve 500 or more people.

The NSW Health Minister has a similar power to issue executive orders to reduce public health risks during a state of emergency. However, unlike Victoria, NSW has not declared a State of emergency, and may not need to, given the power contained in PHA section 7.

Escalation: national biosecurity laws

Australia’s first case of covid-19 was reported by federal Health Minister Greg Hunt MP on 25 January, in a man who flew from Guandong to Melbourne.

On that date, Minister Hunt advised that “Human coronavirus with pandemic potential” had already been declared a “Listed human disease” under the Biosecurity Act 2015, “enabling the use of enhanced border measures”.  [See here for the current legislative instrument setting out the full set of Listed Human Diseases].

The listing of coronavirus also led to the activation of the National Incident Centre, and regular meetings of the Australian Health Protection Principle Committee – the key decision-making committee for public health emergencies.

Declaring that a disease is a “listed human disease” Under the Biosecurity Act 2015 (Cth) is a condition precedent to the Health Minister imposing enhanced border measures.  These may encompass specific entry and exit requirements (ss 44-45), restrictions on incoming aircraft (s 49), and preventive biosecurity measures (s 51).

For example, individuals arriving on airplanes or vessels subject to biosecurity control may be required to be screened to determine if they have been infected or exposed to a listed human disease: see s 44 and Biosecurity (Entry Requirements) Determination 2016, s 6.

As explained in a previous post, the listing of coronavirus is also a condition precedent to the imposition, by human biosecurity officers, of biosecurity control orders on individuals.

These orders may encompass a range of specific measures, such as a requirement to remain at home (s 87), to provide body samples for analysis (s 91) or remain isolated at a specified medical facility (s 97).

The powers in the federal Biosecurity Act go well beyond those in the NSW Public Health Act in terms of seeking to balance the precautionary principle with the requirement for proportionality and the least restrictive alternative.

Subject to the appointment of state and territory public health officials as human biosecurity officers under the Biosecurity Act 2015, as envisaged by ss 562-566, these federal powers could be exercised and enforced.

Nevertheless, on a number of occasions Dr Murphy has suggested he will not exercise his coercive powers.

In a press conference on 29 January, he said: “For returned travellers from Hubei province, we are asking for them to remain isolated. We don’t intend to use enforcement powers”.

More recently he stated: “Under the Biosecurity Act in most cases I can compel people to have tests or be detained if they’re a biosecurity risk”. “[B]ut we don’t use those powers and hope never to use them.  People are generally co-operative”.

Statements like this may be an attempt to calm people and to encourage voluntary cooperation, or might instead reflect the assumption that the States have adequate powers to enforce compliance with biosecurity controls.

Nevertheless, assuring people that biosecurity controls are voluntary is unhelpful if a deteriorating situation later compels their use.

It’s vital for the public to know when their cooperation is voluntary and when disobedience could result in penalties.

At any rate, it’s clear that since 21 January – when it became a “Listed human disease” under Commonwealth law, “human coronavirus with pandemic potential” ceased being simply a jurisdictional health challenge.

Escalation: national state of emergency?

Under the Biosecurity Act 2015, the federal Health Minister may exercise broad, emergency powers where the Governor General has declared that a “Listed human disease” constitutes a “human biosecurity emergency” (chapter 8, Part 2).

This is no longer an unrealistic scenario if Australia’s situation deteriorates.  If the sharp rise in cases continues, it could support the case for mandatory, strengthened social distancing measures, agreed to by the National Security Committee and implemented by an executive instrument signed by the Health Minister (see ss 477-478).

The case for declaring a national state of emergency might also arise if the surge in cases of covid-19 overwhelmed the capacity of the health care system to treat cases effectively.

I’m surprised that schools are still open in NSW and that more limiting social distancing measures have not been put in place.

The Australian Health Protection Principal Committee, not to mention the National Security Committee, will be deliberating these matters, informed by models of likely spread if various drastic – and not so drastic – restrictions are imposed.  Keeping the economy running, and businesses solvent, is also critical.

The reason we know that Australia is currently experiencing a surge of cases of community transmission is because, on 11 February, the Chief Medical Officer added “Human coronavirus with pandemic potential” as a temporary addition to the National Notifiable Disease List, formalising national reporting by the States and Territories.

Legal management of the novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV) in Australia

On 31 January the Director-General of the World Health Organisation, Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus declared the novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC), following the advice of the Emergency Committee.  (See here).

Under the International Health Regulations, which govern global management of infectious disease outbreaks, a declaration that a PHEIC exists is a prerogative of the Director-General, and triggers the requirement to issue temporary recommendations, after receiving information from the Emergency Committee (See IHR, Arts. 15, 49).

You can see the WHO Director-General’s recommendations to the People’s Republic of China here. (And see here for the most recent WHO situation reports).

2019-nCoV was first identified in Wuhan, China, around 12 December.

As at 6 February 2020, over 28,060 cases had been identified in China, with 564 deaths; 24 countries outside China have also identified cases, with one death confirmed in the Philippines.

In Australia, as at 6 February, 15 cases of 2019-nCoV had been identified in 4 States: 5 in Qld, 4 each in NSW and Victoria, and 2 in SA.  You can see latest updates for Australia, and other resources here.

You can see a timeline of events from Australia’s perspective here, and from a US perspective here.

From a legal perspective, how is Australia managing the risks posed by 2019-nCoV?

Australia has imposed travel restrictions on foreign nationals departing from or transiting mainland China.  These apply for 14 days from 1 February, and may well be extended.

There are no exceptions for Chinese (international) students studying at Australian universities or attending Australian schools: almost two thirds of the 190,000 Chinese students who have Australian visas are still overseas.

Australian citizens currently in China are permitted to re-enter Australia, but must self-isolate for 14 days.  This means not attending public places including work, school or university, or childcare, not allowing visitors into the home and wearing a surgical mask if it becomes necessary to leave the home for medical treatment.  See here.

With the exception of the blanket travel ban, which a number of other countries including New Zealand, and the United States have also imposed, Australia’s response remains low-key.

States and Territories are primarily responsible for managing outbreaks of infectious diseases within their territories, and this remains the case with 2019-nCoV.

The Commonwealth, on the other hand, has “primary responsibility for international border surveillance and responding to public health events occurring at international borders”: see the National Health Security Agreement (para 22).

The Australian Government Department of Health website states that:

The Australian Health Protection Principal Committee has taken a highly precautionary approach in recommending the 14-day isolation period, with the aim of this policy being containment of novel coronavirus and the prevention of person- to-person transmission within Australia.”

Australia has not yet imposed centralised control or activated the coercive powers that are available if this outbreak were to gain momentum.

In Australia, the Australian Health Protection Principal Committee (AHPPC) is the peak body for national emergency health planning, preparedness, response and recovery during public health emergencies.  AHPPC is administered by the Office of Health Protection, a division of the Australian Department of Health.

The National Health Security Agreement identifies a number of potential triggers for a coordinated national response, led by the AHPPC, with operational control vested in the Director of Human Biosecurity.  However, it remains for the Commonwealth to assess whether the risks of disease transmission are so significant that they require a centralised, national operational response (see para 24).

An audit of the Health Department’s coordination of communicable disease emergencies notes the relative ambiguity of the conditions that would justify a national operational response (see pp 30-33, 47).

With travel bans keeping imported cases to a minimum, and limited scope for significant person-to-person spread within Australia, the States and Territories will very likely continue to retain operational control.

The Biosecurity Act 2015 (Cth) does give the Commonwealth a wide range of coercive powers, where necessary.

For example, under ss. 44-46, entry and exit requirements (as distinct from recommendations) may be imposed on classes of people to prevent the spread of a “listed human disease”, and there are civil penalties for failing to comply.

Similarly, individuals can be subjected to a “human biosecurity control order” containing any of a number of specific “biosecurity measures”, including isolation measures (s 97), restrictions on movement and behaviour (s 87), and the requirement to undergo examination and provide body samples (ss 90-91).

However, as s 44(1) and s 60 makes clear, these powers apply to a “listed human disease”: they exist to prevent a “listed human disease” from entering or spreading in Australia.

Section 42 contains the test that the Director of Human Biosecurity (the Commonwealth Chief Medical Officer) must apply before he or she lists a human disease.  (The test is whether the disease is communicable and may cause significant harm to public health, and if the Director of Human Biosecurity has consulted with the chief health officers of the States and Territories.)

While there is nothing in principle to prevent the Chief Medical Officer from issuing a legislative instrument making 2019-nCoV a listed human disease under s 42, I am not aware that this has happened.

Nor does it appear that 2019-nCoV has yet been added to the National Notifiable Disease List: the national set of diseases that is the result of national reporting arrangements by the States and Territories (see National Health Security Act 2007, s 11).

This does not mean that self-isolation “recommendations” are voluntary.  It simply means that cases or contacts entering Australia are subject to the relevant State or Territory legislative framework that governs disease spread.

In NSW, “Novel Coronavirus 2019” was scheduled under the Public Health Act 2010 (NSW) by executive order on 21 January.  As a result, a number of statutory obligations and public health powers thereafter apply to identified cases, and to those who have come in contact with a case.

For example, 2019-nCoV is notifiable by medical practitioners and laboratories (ss 54-55).  A person infected with 2019-nCoV who is in a public place must take reasonable care not to spread the condition (s 52), and the Secretary of the NSW Health Department may direct a person to undergo medical examination on reasonable suspicion that they represent a risk to public health (s 61).  There is a financial penalty for non-compliance.

If a person who is infected with or has been exposed to 2019-nCoV is behaving in a way that will likely endanger the public’s health, the Chief Health Officer of NSW can make a public health order requiring the person to refrain from behaviour that places others at risk and to undergo medical treatment and testing (s 62).

These are time-limited orders not exceeding 28 days (s 63) which can be reviewed by the Civil and Administrative Tribunal and, where necessary, extended (ss 65-66).  Failure to comply with a public health order may result in a substantial fine (up to $11,000) or imprisonment.

These muscular State (and Territory) laws are, of course, premised on an infectious condition being scheduled under the Act, and on there being an adequate case definition to identify cases and contacts.

Early on in an outbreak of a novel infectious disease, a precise, workable case definition may not exist, together with information about modes of transmission, incubation period (prior to symptoms) and capacity for pre-symptomatic transmission.  See here for the somewhat unwieldy definition of a “suspect case” of 2019-nCoV adopted in NSW, and Victoria, respectively.

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