Gender dysphoria is a condition where a person feels that their biological sex is deeply incongruent with their perceived gender, causing him or her significant distress. Stage 1 of treatment involves the administration of puberty-suppressant hormones. Stage 2 involves the administration of cross-sex hormones that promote the development of physical characteristics of the opposite sex.
Treatment for gender dysphoria has become an important topic within the law on consent to medical treatment, because the Family Court receives an increasing number of applications to authorize treatment for children with gender dysphoria. If you’re not familiar with this area, some background on children’s ability to consent to medical treatment is helpful before discussing these cases.
Consent to medical treatment: the role of parents and children
Marion’s Case remains the foundational case on minors’ ability to consent to medical treatment. This case dealt with the sterilization of a 16 year old woman with an intellectual disability, who was incapable of consenting to treatment. In this case the High Court held that a child can consent to medical treatment when he or she “achieves a sufficient understanding of and intelligence to enable him or her to understand fully what is proposed” (following the English case of Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority).
If a child is not “Gillick competent,” then her parents can consent to medical treatment on her behalf. However, the High Court in Marion’s Case held that there are some forms of treatment (known as “special treatment”) that fall outside of parental authority and require court authorization.
Marion’s parents could not consent to her sterilization because it was “non-therapeutic” treatment, and because the procedure was irreversible, there was a significant risk of making the wrong decision (either about the child’s capacity to consent or as to what was in her best interests), and the consequences of a wrong decision were particularly grave.
Since Marion’s Case the courts have extended the category of “special treatment” to include other procedures. In doing so, they have categorized these procedures as “non-therapeutic” and applied the list of factors relied upon by the High Court in Marion’s Case.
Consent to treatment for childhood gender dysphoria
The Family Court originally held that treatment for gender dysphoria was a form of special treatment, and required court authorization for both stage 1 and stage 2 treatment. However, Re Jamie modified this position. In this case the court held that treatment for gender dysphoria was therapeutic and that parents could consent to stage 1 treatment. Children could consent to stage 2 if they were Gillick competent, but if they were not, then court authorization remained appropriate.
Relying on Marion’s Case, the Family Court also held that the court must determine whether the child is Gillick competent, as stage 2 treatment was irreversible, there was a significant risk of making the wrong decision, and the consequences of a wrong decision were particularly grave.
Re Martin: problems with the current position
The Family Court considered a case on treatment for gender dysphoria just before Christmas, Re Martin. The case did not change the Family Court’s position on treatment for gender dysphoria (being the judgment of a single judge), but Justice Bennett (who decided the case), offered an insightful critique of Re Jamie.
Martin (aged 16) was born a girl, but identified as male from a very young age, and had been diagnosed with gender dysphoria. Martin lived as a boy, but he experienced worsening depression as he approached puberty. Martin’s parents and treating physicians supported cross-sex hormone therapy and applied to the court for authorization.
In her Honour’s decision, Justice Bennett argued that the Family Court’s reliance on Marion’s Case in Re Jamie was contradictory and inconsistent. One of the grounds for this argument was as follows:
The Full Court in Re Jamie accepted that gender dysphoria is a recognized psychological condition and that treatment is “therapeutic.” However, the court decided that it still needed to authorize stage 2 treatment if the child was not Gillick competent (relying on the factors listed in Marion’s Case).
According to Marion’s Case, parents can consent to therapeutic treatment even if it has grave and permanent effects. However, the approach taken by the Family Court suggests that therapeutic treatment can still be classified as special treatment based on an assessment of the factors set out in Marion’s Case. Accordingly, court authorization will be required for some forms of therapeutic treatment.
Re Jamie seems like a case of wanting to have your cake and eat it too. The court respects children’s rights by allowing Gillick competent children to consent to stage 2 treatment. But the court seems uneasy about the idea of stage 2 treatment taking place without any form of court oversight, hence it retains a role in either confirming that a child is Gillick competent or in authorizing treatment where the child cannot consent on her own behalf.
This appears to strike a good balance between respecting children’s autonomy and recognizing their need for protection. But the court’s ruling is a significant departure from Marion’s Case, and it blurs the distinction between therapeutic and non-therapeutic treatment (although this distinction has always been problematic).
Time for a change in the law?
As pointed out by Justice Bennett in Re Martin, there are good practical reasons for not requiring court authorization of treatment for gender dysphoria. In uncontroversial cases (which they almost always are), the court will simply follow the doctors’ advice, and it is difficult to see what advantages are added by court involvement.
Court proceedings have significant emotional and financial costs for children and their parents. Some children may forego treatment because their families cannot afford to make a court application. On the other hand, this is a complex area of medical practice, and stage 2 treatment can have profound and irreversible effects on children’s social and sexual identity.
Justice Bennett concluded Re Martin by finding that Martin was Gillick competent, but her Honour also invited the court (or parliament) to change the law. This seems sorely needed – both to clarify the position on “special treatment,” and to facilitate access to treatment for children for gender dysphoria. On balance, the costs of court authorization outweigh any possible benefits, suggesting that court oversight in undisputed cases is not in the best interests of children with gender dysphoria.
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