The decision in Central Queensland Hospital and Health Service v Q raises interesting issues in relation to the criminalization of abortion in Queensland and children’s ability to consent to medical treatment.
Q was a pregnant 12 year old girl who was referred to medical staff at the Central Queensland Hospital after asking her GP for an abortion. Q was finding the pregnancy “very stressful emotionally” and had run away from home, self-harmed, and attempted suicide on two occasions.
The medical specialists and counselors that had met with Q supported her decision to terminate the pregnancy, as did Q’s parents. There was evidence that continuing the pregnancy would pose significant risks to Q’s physical and mental health.
Central Queensland Hospital sought orders from the Court authorizing the termination of Q’s pregnancy. These were granted by Justice McMeekin in the Queensland Supreme Court on the 20th of April, followed by the judge’s reasons a week later.
The parens patriae jurisdiction
The Supreme Court’s parens patriae jurisdiction formed the basis for the Court’s intervention. This jurisdiction grants Supreme Courts wide powers in relation to the welfare of children, with the best interests of the child being the Court’s primary consideration.
Could Q consent to the treatment?
As I discuss in an earlier post, a child can consent to medical procedures when he or she “achieves a sufficient understanding and intelligence to enable him or her to understand fully what is proposed,” i.e., is Gillick competent (following Gillick v West Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Authority  AC 112).
Generally speaking, parents can consent to treatment on children’s behalf when they are not Gillick competent. However, there are some forms of treatment that fall outside the scope of parental consent, known as “special medical treatment.”
Justice McMeekin held that terminations are one such form of treatment (following State of Queensland v B  QSC 231). Accordingly, court authorization for the treatment would be needed if Q herself was not competent to consent to the treatment.
Justice McMeekin found that Q had a good understanding of the risks involved in the procedure, but doubted that she had the maturity to fully appreciate the long-term consequences of a decision to continue with the pregnancy. Accordingly, she was unable to make a fully informed decision and was not competent to consent to the termination. As such, it was appropriate to invoke the Court’s parens patriae jurisdiction.
Could the treatment be performed lawfully?
Queensland’s Criminal Code criminalizes the termination a pregnancy, unless authorized or justified by law. Section 282 of the Code provides that a person is not criminally responsible for performing a termination so long as it is for the patient’s benefit or to preserve the mother’s life, and is reasonable in the circumstances.
Section 286 of the Code also provides that a “person who has care of a child” must provide the necessaries of life for the child, and take reasonable precautions to prevent danger to a child’s health, including their mental health. The definition of “a person who has care of a child” can include hospitals and doctors who care for children.
In determining whether the termination was lawful, Justice McMeekin followed the approach of the Victorian Supreme Court in R v Davidson  VR 667, which held that an abortion would be lawful where it was believed on reasonable grounds that the abortion was necessary to prevent serious danger to the patient’s life or health, and it was not out of proportion to the danger to be averted.
Justice McMeekin held that it was clearly in Q’s best interests for termination of the pregnancy to proceed, as it was necessary in order to prevent serious danger to Q’s mental and physical health. Further, the proposed response was not out of proportion to the danger to Q’s health. Accordingly, the termination would not be considered unlawful, and it could be justified under sections 282 and 286 of the Code.
Justice McMeekin declared that: the termination of the pregnancy through the administration of drugs was lawful; Q should be permitted to undergo the termination; and the hospital’s staff be permitted to perform it. If the drugs failed to effect a termination within five days, Q’s pregnancy could be terminated using a surgical procedure.
What are the implications of the decision for access to abortion services in Queensland?
The criminalization of abortion in Queensland creates a barrier to women’s access to reproductive services. Q was forced to wait weeks for court authorization for her termination. In 2010 a young Cairns couple faced criminal charges for importing the abortion drug Misoprostol and inducing a miscarriage at home. They were ultimately found not guilty, but following that case, many doctors in Queensland stopped performing abortions.
Lucy Clark in The Guardian suggests that similar fears and uncertainties may be behind Q’s doctors’ decision to seek court authorization for her treatment. She may be right in that respect, but it must be kept in mind that the Queensland Supreme Court characterizes abortion as a form of “special medical treatment” that parents cannot consent to. Accordingly, court authorization would still be needed to perform a termination on a child that was not Gillick competent, regardless of abortion’s status under criminal law.
Kerridge, Lowe and Stewart criticize the characterization of abortion as a form of special medical treatment, arguing that it should fall within the scope of parental consent for children’s medical treatment. A change in the common law would be required in order for a termination to be performed on a non-Gillick competent child without court authorization (although the courts could still intervene under their parens patriae jurisdiction).
Nevertheless, the decriminalization of abortion in Queensland is still an important step in enhancing respect for women’s reproductive rights, and in ensuring access to abortion services.
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