Calvary’s proposed hospital acquisitions and access to care in the Hunter region

First published on rudge.tv

When Healthscope’s receivers announced in September 2026 that they had reached agreements for the sale of its hospitals, they said the agreements would ensure continuity of operations. Now that the licence transfers are in play, however, continuity seems less certain.

One of the hospitals up for transfer is Newcastle Private Hospital, which opened in 1994. An in vitro fertilisation (IVF) clinic, Hunter IVF, uses the hospital’s operating theatres for egg retrievals. Calvary Health Care, the parent company of the subsidiary applying to take over the licences, has said it will cease to offer IVF and other assisted reproductive technology services there if the takeover proceeds. What this means is that Hunter IVF would need to find another theatre for its egg retrievals. It has said it is already working with other providers.

Newcastle Private Hospital during the hospital upgrade works.
Newcastle Private Hospital during the hospital upgrade works. BXD Projects.

Egg retrieval is just one of the services hanging in the balance. On 5 November, Calvary confirmed that it would cease to offer elective terminations of pregnancy and voluntary assisted dying (VAD), subject to its legal obligations. Its announcement also identified gender reassignment procedures and sterilisation or contraceptive procedures where fertility prevention is their sole purpose. Calvary expects most other services to continue. In explaining its proposed changes, it referred to the Code of Ethical Standards for Catholic Health and Aged Care Services in Australia.

For someone already going through IVF, continuity of care is a practical matter. An egg retrieval has to take place at a particular point in the cycle, and whether it can go ahead as planned can make a difference to the patient’s prospect of having a genetically related child. As Ben Clifford reported for ABC Newcastle, some patients already travel hours for specialist care in Newcastle. An alternative provider, even one nearby, may already have a full theatre list.

I was asked on 10 November to speak to ABC Newcastle about the laws that would apply if these transfers proceeded. Some of my comments aired the following morning. The questions are similar to those I considered last year when AAP FactCheck asked me about the claim that a proposed NSW abortion bill would force Christian hospitals to close. In that analysis, the distinction between a licensed private facility and a recognised hospital in the public system was important. In many ways, this episode is an inversion of the story I fact-checked. There, it was said that a change in the law would lead to Catholic hospitals being acquired or shut down, with the ACT acquisition discussed below invoked as a warning. Here, a Catholic provider proposes to acquire existing private hospitals and narrow the range of services available at them.

Six nurses lean over the balcony of the Newcastle Mater Hospital nurses’ home in Waratah.
Six nurses lean over the balcony of the Newcastle Mater Hospital nurses’ home in Waratah. Sam Hood, February 1939. State Library of NSW, item 12081.

Calvary’s place in the public and private systems

Calvary already operates a public hospital in Newcastle. Schedule 3 to the Health Services Act 1997 (NSW) lists Calvary Health Care (Newcastle) Limited as an affiliated health organisation (AHO) and Calvary Mater Newcastle as its recognised establishment. Under s 7(2), AHO status applies in relation to the recognised establishment or service. Under s 65, the Minister can give directions about the Mater’s role and functions. Section 62 provides for the Governor, but not the Minister, to amend Schedule 3 by order, including to remove a recognised establishment from the schedule. Newcastle Private and Hunter Valley Private are licensed private facilities. The Mater’s listing does not bring either private hospital within the Minister’s s 65 direction power.

If the acquisitions proceed, Calvary will straddle the public and private systems in the Hunter: it will continue to operate the Mater, a public hospital with 210 beds according to Calvary’s parliamentary submission, while acquiring Newcastle Private and Hunter Valley Private, with 189 beds and 83 beds respectively, and running them as private facilities. There can be advantages in that arrangement. One organisation may be able to share equipment or refer patients to specialist facilities that are not replicated in the bigger hospital. But where Calvary reduces the services available at a private facility, the effect may be to reduce the options available to patients in the public system as well. A doctor quoted in the press said that the Mater had transferred patients to Newcastle Private for VAD. I return to that arrangement below.

The circular stairwell on the front façade of the Newcastle Mater nurses’ home.
February 1939. The circular stairwell on the front façade of the Newcastle Mater nurses’ home. Sam Hood. State Library of NSW, item 12083.
Mater Misericordiae Hospital in Waratah, with a cross on its central tower
Circa 1960s. Mater Misericordiae Hospital, Waratah, Vinco series no. 15. University of Newcastle Special Collections.
Glazed main entrance and illuminated canopy at Calvary Mater Newcastle at night
Modern campus. Main entrance to Calvary Mater Newcastle at night. PTW Architects project gallery.
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Licence classes and conditions

The Private Health Facilities Act 2007 (NSW) (PHF Act) is the relevant NSW enactment for private hospitals. Section 11(c) requires a licence to specify the class or classes of facility for which it is issued. Section 12(1) allows the Health Secretary to impose conditions specific to the licence. Under ss 12(2)(d) and (e), the licensee must comply with the applicable licensing standards and conduct the facility so that ‘reasonable standards of patient care and safety’ are maintained.

The primary legislation is fairly mechanical, but Schedule 3 to the Private Health Facilities Regulation 2024 (NSW) puts more detail around what a maternity service must be able to do. Under cl 49, a facility licensed for maternity services must have the staff and support to care for normal risk pregnancies. In ordinary cases, a medical practitioner must be on site and experienced midwives must be on duty at all times. The facility must also have access to obstetricians, anaesthetists and a paediatrician on call at all times. Clause 51 requires suitable accommodation and procedures for healthy newborns and those with minimal complications. Clause 52 requires transfer procedures for patients who need a higher level of care, including provision for resuscitating or stabilising newborns before transfer.

The two maternity levels govern which patients a facility may admit. Under cl 48, a level 1 facility generally admits patients for maternity procedures from 37 completed weeks of pregnancy. Clause 50(1) prohibits it from admitting patients with additional risk pregnancies. A level 2 facility generally admits patients from 34 completed weeks. Under cl 48(3), admission from 32 weeks is possible if the facility also holds a neonatal class licence and its licence carries a condition requiring the resources and clinical expertise the Secretary considers appropriate for care at that stage of pregnancy. The facility must also have a written policy developed having regard to the maternity and neonatal service capability guideline. Under cl 50(2), a level 2 facility may admit a patient with an additional risk pregnancy only if its medical advisory committee is satisfied it can provide appropriate care for that patient and the facility has the necessary staff and support, including a special care nursery.

The Newcastle Private transfer notice lists maternity and neonatal care as well as surgery and anaesthesia. The neonatal class is consistent with the facility being level 2, but the notice does not establish its maternity level or whether the licence permits admission from 32 weeks. I have not seen the licence itself. Hunter Valley Private’s notice lists surgery but does not list maternity.

Hunter Valley Private Hospital, Shortland.
Hunter Valley Private Hospital, Shortland. Australia247 listing.

Calvary’s proposed withdrawal of elective terminations

Schedule 1 to the regulation describes the maternity class by reference to care associated with childbirth, from antenatal care through to care immediately afterwards. It includes surgical intervention to achieve childbirth. The surgical class is defined by the kinds of anaesthesia or sedation used. Schedule 3 requires a surgical facility to hold a concurrent anaesthesia licence and to keep a register and clinical records for the procedures it performs. Neither set of standards expressly requires a facility to offer elective terminations or make theatre time available for IVF egg retrieval. The fact that Newcastle Private has previously made those services available does not itself create a duty under the regulation to continue doing so.

On my reading, then, the regulation permits Newcastle Private to withdraw elective terminations while retaining its maternity and surgical classes. A condition on the particular licence could change that analysis. The hospital must still meet the standards for the care it provides. If, for instance, withdrawing elective terminations also removed theatre or anaesthetic capabilities on which the hospital relies to respond safely to an obstetric complication, the staffing and transfer provisions would feature in any assessment of licence compliance.

The licence transfers and the proposed ‘pause’

Calvary Health Care proposes to acquire the two hospitals from Healthscope through its wholly owned subsidiary, LCMHC 2 Limited. That company is named as the applicant in both licence transfer notices. Section 15(2) of the PHF Act requires the Health Secretary to transfer a licence on an application made in accordance with that section, subject to the grounds for refusal in s 15(4). The Secretary may refuse if satisfied that the applicant fails the fit and proper test. For a corporate applicant, that test extends to its directors and persons concerned in its management. The Secretary may also refuse if satisfied that the applicant would be unable to conduct the facility in accordance with the applicable licensing standards.

Section 18 allows the Secretary to require further information from the applicant. Section 20 provides for public notice and requires the Secretary to consider representations made within the applicable period. Separately, s 17(3)(c) allows the Secretary to amend or revoke discretionary conditions or attach further conditions to a licence.

Much of the discussion has, understandably, proceeded without reference to particular provisions of the Act. There has been talk, for instance, of the Minister or the Secretary ‘pausing’ the transfers. Much depends on what is meant by a pause. Section 15 contains no express pause power. NSW Health’s indicative timeframes refer to ‘stop the clock’ exceptions, but the clock in that guidance is the department’s processing target. If the Secretary needs to know how the incoming operator will meet staffing or transfer standards, s 18 allows the Secretary to ask for that information and consider the answer before deciding. A delay imposed simply to preserve a particular regional service would need a statutory basis of its own, and I do not see one in the PHF Act. The loss of a service can still be relevant insofar as it bears on the operator’s ability to meet the applicable standards.

Submissions on both transfers closed on 3 November. The notices listed the proposed licence classes but did not set out the procedures Calvary intended to withdraw. There had already been reporting about possible cuts, but Calvary publicly confirmed its plans on 5 November. It is unclear which details NSW Health had before submissions closed or how much people making submissions knew about Calvary’s intentions. On 10 November, Jeremy Buckingham MLC, a Legalise Cannabis Party member of the Legislative Council, gave notice of a motion seeking scrutiny of the proposed transfers and assurances about continuity of care. The motion also calls for legislation, if necessary, to preserve access to lawful services when hospitals change ownership. These are propositions Buckingham has asked the Council to adopt. The statutory test for the transfers remains the one in s 15.1

On 12 November, in answer to a question from Dr Amanda Cohn in the Legislative Council, Courtney Houssos said the Health Minister and the Health Secretary were ‘directly engaging on this issue’ and that the government was looking for a practical way to ensure continuity of care.2 The following day, Calvary confirmed that the planned transition would no longer take place on 30 November. As at 16 November, the parties were working to agree on a new date and regulatory approvals were still required. Whether the Secretary had taken any step under the PHF Act to defer either licence transfer was unclear.

The ACCC’s merger review

Another aspect of the proposed acquisition concerns Australian competition law. Under s 51ABZE(1) of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), the ACCC determines whether a notified acquisition may be put into effect. Section 51ABZF separately allows it to attach conditions to a determination permitting an acquisition. The key competition question is whether the acquisition would have, or would be likely to have, the effect of substantially lessening competition in any market. To prohibit an acquisition under s 51ABZE, the ACCC must first take it to phase 2 review and give a notice of competition concerns. In making its determination, it must have regard to the object of the Act and all relevant matters, including the interests of consumers.

Section 51ABZH(2) requires the ACCC to have regard to all relevant matters in assessing the effect on competition. Under s 51ABZH(4), an acquisition may substantially lessen competition if it creates, strengthens or entrenches a substantial degree of power in a market, or is likely to do so. Section 4G provides that lessening competition includes preventing or hindering it.

The relevant market is an important question here. Both facilities are private hospitals, and private hospitals may compete across a range of services. A nearby hospital may look like an alternative on paper. For a particular procedure, though, it is important to consider whether that facility has theatre capacity and whether the clinicians concerned can practise there. For the patient, the distance they would have to travel may affect whether that alternative is realistically available.

Healthscope’s receivership brings the counterfactual into view. Another purchaser might keep a hospital open and retain the service in question. Some services might have to move even if Calvary’s acquisition does not proceed. If they did move, the ACCC would still have to consider the capacity and incentive of other providers to take those patients. The prospect of keeping the hospitals open and the proposed withdrawal of particular services both belong in that comparison.

The ACCC considered a version of this issue in April 2026, when it assessed Calvary’s acquisition of Holmesglen Private Hospital in Victoria. It considered submissions about the likely withdrawal of certain reproductive procedures at Holmesglen and determined at phase 1 that the acquisition could proceed.3 In the Hunter, a withdrawal may be relevant to competition if the acquisition removes an option that would otherwise give providers a reason to maintain the range or quality of their services. That depends on the alternatives actually available to patients in the Hunter and how they would fare if this acquisition did not go ahead.

The lounge and waiting room of the Newcastle Mater nurses’ home.
The lounge and waiting room of the Newcastle Mater nurses’ home. Sam Hood, February 1939. State Library of NSW, item 12095.

The Catholic Code and its legal status as hospital policy

One of the documents Calvary has referred to in explaining its decisions is the Code of Ethical Standards for Catholic Health and Aged Care Services in Australia. It has its origins in a tradition of Catholic moral theology. Within Calvary, it takes effect as hospital policy because Calvary has adopted it to guide its decisions. Calvary, in that sense, regulates its own conduct as a Catholic institution. It may do so insofar as its decisions are consistent with legislation and the conditions of its licences. Its general law duties to patients also continue to apply.

The Code’s treatment of IVF draws on a distinction found in the Vatican’s Donum vitae (1987) and restated in Dignitas personae (2008). An intervention that helps the marital act to ‘achieve its natural purpose’ can be permissible. IVF is objectionable on this account because fertilisation occurs through a procedure that takes the place of the marital act. The objection applies even where IVF uses the gametes of a married couple and is arranged to avoid destroying embryos. Where IVF produces embryos that are later discarded or used in research, that gives rise to a further objection under the Code and the documents on which it draws.4

A medical condition may prevent a couple from having intercourse or make conception through intercourse impossible. If both fallopian tubes are blocked, for example, sperm cannot reach an egg through the usual route. The doctrine leaves room for treatment that can remedy the condition — Dignitas personae gives ‘surgery for the unblocking of fallopian tubes’ as an example. But where the blockage cannot be remedied — for example, when both fallopian tubes are too badly scarred to be repaired surgically — the objection to IVF still applies. This is the sense in which the doctrine treats IVF as a substitute for sex rather than as a remedy for the underlying condition.

It is also notable that the Code has recently undergone revision. Catholic Health Australia describes the 2026 revision as the first substantive update in 25 years. Its annual report identifies the introduction of VAD legislation and advances in clinical technology as developments to which the revision responds. The revised text was presented to the Australian Catholic Bishops Conference in May 2026 and, according to the report, was in the final stages of endorsement. In New South Wales, that work took place against the background of the Abortion Law Reform Act 2019 and the Voluntary Assisted Dying Act 2022.

Registered practitioners may follow the Catholic Code insofar as their conduct remains consistent with their own legal and professional obligations. Section 39 of the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law authorises National Boards to develop and approve codes and guidelines. Under s 41, an approved code or guideline is admissible in proceedings under the National Law as evidence of appropriate professional conduct or practice. The Medical Board’s Good medical practice has that status. The Catholic Code has no equivalent status under the National Law, although its application could still be relevant as a matter of fact. A hospital policy might, for example, explain why a practitioner acted as they did. The professional code would remain evidence of the standard against which that conduct is assessed.

Responsibilities for care already underway

Section 39(7) of the PHF Act puts responsibility for patient safety and clinical governance on the licensee. Schedule 2 cl 18 of the regulation requires a facility to have transfer procedures where it lacks authorisation to provide the care needed, or where complications during treatment call for a higher level of care. Under cl 19, when a patient transfers to another private facility or a public hospital for care, a copy of the relevant clinical records must go to the receiving facility. When the licence itself transfers, cl 12(2) requires all of the facility’s clinical records to be made available to the incoming licensee.

The treating practitioner has obligations of their own. Section 6.3 of the Medical Board’s Good medical practice calls on doctors to arrange continuing care in advance where possible and to communicate those arrangements to the patient and those taking over their care. It also calls on them to provide enough clinical information for care to continue. These standards apply to a referral before admission as well as to a handover between treating teams.

The hospital’s common law duty to take reasonable care applies alongside the licensing obligations and the practitioner’s professional obligations. In Kondis v State Transport Authority, Mason J used the hospital–patient relationship to explain the non-delegable duty. A hospital that undertakes to provide treatment must ensure that reasonable care is taken in providing it, including where it engages someone else to perform that work on its behalf.5 In Ellis v Wallsend District Hospital, the NSW Court of Appeal distinguished care the hospital undertook to provide from treatment a practitioner provided under a direct engagement with the patient.6 The scope of the undertaking is important here. Newcastle Private’s responsibility for the arrangements it controls, including any theatre booking and the handling of its own clinical records, can be assessed separately from Hunter IVF’s responsibility for managing the patient’s cycle.

The standard of reasonable care depends in part on the patient’s treatment and their particular needs, including how far along they are in the cycle. Under s 5B of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), a failure to take precautions can amount to negligence if the risk was foreseeable and not insignificant and a reasonable person in the same position would have taken those precautions. For someone already going through IVF, the immediate question is whether their scheduled egg retrieval can go ahead at another facility at the required point in the cycle. If another team takes over, the patient needs to know who will be treating them, and that team needs the clinical information already gathered. Some of it may be in the clinic’s detailed patient notes and may have to be sent directly to the receiving team. The same considerations may apply to a scheduled sperm retrieval, particularly if it needs to be coordinated with the egg retrieval.

Abortion law and emergency care

Earlier in this post, I referred to obligations arising under legislation in addition to those that attach to a private hospital’s licence. The first is the Abortion Law Reform Act 2019 (NSW). Section 9 deals with the conscientious objections of individual registered health practitioners. Where s 9(2) applies, the practitioner must disclose their objection as soon as practicable. If a patient asks the practitioner to perform a termination on them or to advise them about it, s 9(3) requires the practitioner to act without delay. They can give the patient information about how to locate or contact a medical practitioner they reasonably believe does not object. Alternatively, they can transfer care to a practitioner or service they reasonably believe can provide the requested care through a practitioner who does not object. Under s 9(4), giving information approved by the Health Secretary satisfies the information requirement. NSW Health identifies the NSW Pregnancy Choices Helpline as one way to do that.

Section 9(5) preserves existing emergency duties. A practitioner who would otherwise be under a duty to provide or assist with emergency treatment must still do so despite their objection. The treatment required depends on the circumstances and the practitioner’s role and competence. Section 4.5 of NSW Health’s statutory guideline gives the example of a termination necessary to save the pregnant patient’s life.

Section 6 separately regulates terminations where the patient is more than 22 weeks pregnant. Ordinarily, two specialist medical practitioners must consider there are sufficient grounds for the termination. The practitioner performing it must obtain informed consent and perform it at a hospital controlled by a statutory health organisation or at a facility approved under s 13. Under s 6(5), a medical practitioner, whether or not a specialist, may perform an emergency termination without following ss 6(1) and (3) if they consider it necessary to save the patient’s life or to ‘save another foetus’. The latter refers to a different fetus in the same pregnancy, for example the other twin. Section 6(5) authorises the procedure in those circumstances. Any duty to act comes from the practitioner’s existing obligations, which s 9(5) preserves.

Calvary’s announcement concerns elective terminations. For the maternity service it proposes to continue at Newcastle Private, the practical question is how the new operator will respond if a patient presents with a complication for which termination is clinically indicated and delay could expose them to harm. A termination can be clinically indicated and still be scheduled in advance. If the patient needs urgent treatment, the treating team will have to decide whether a transfer can be made safely and in time. A practitioner who has no conscientious objection may still work at a facility that restricts the service. Their duties have to be considered in light of the circumstances of the patient’s care. If the facility cannot provide the procedure, the practitioner may need to stabilise the patient and arrange a safe transfer where one is possible. The hospital’s own patient safety and transfer obligations apply alongside those duties.

Voluntary assisted dying and access to another facility

Just as termination of pregnancy has been an issue in the proposed transfers, voluntary assisted dying is governed by separate NSW legislation that applies to hospitals in both the public and private systems. Sections 100–106 of the Voluntary Assisted Dying Act 2022 (NSW) set out obligations at different stages of the process. Under s 101, if a patient receiving care, or their agent, tells the operator that the patient wishes to make a first or final request and the hospital does not provide access to the request and assessment process on site, the operator must take reasonable steps to facilitate the patient’s transfer to and from a place where the request can be made. For a first request, the practitioner requested by the patient must be eligible to act as their coordinating practitioner. For a final request, it is the patient’s coordinating practitioner. If the requested practitioner is unavailable, the Act provides for another medical practitioner who is eligible and willing to take on that role.

At later stages, ss 102–106 specify the considerations the operator must take into account in deciding which steps it can reasonably take to facilitate a transfer. It must consider likely serious harm to the patient and any adverse effect on access to VAD. The Act also directs attention to undue delay and prolonged suffering. The operator must consider whether the proposed destination can receive the patient and whether the patient would incur costs or financial loss.

If Newcastle Private ceases to be an available destination for patients from Calvary Mater Newcastle, the Mater will have to consider where else a patient can go for the step they have reached in the process. The availability of another service is important because it affects the steps the hospital can reasonably take for that patient.

Access to treatment when hospitals change hands

The transfer of a hospital licence can give rise to significant bioethical — or, as I would call them, biopolitical — questions when it reduces access to lawful and regulated treatment. There is a comparison to be made with Canberra. In 2023, the ACT compulsorily acquired Calvary’s interest in the land on which Calvary Public Hospital Bruce operated and ended the agreement under which Calvary provided public hospital services. Canberra Health Services took over operations on 3 July and continued to run the facility as North Canberra Hospital. It was already a public hospital, operated by a Catholic provider under an agreement with the Territory. Its position was comparable in that respect to Calvary Mater Newcastle’s, although the Mater’s status as a recognised establishment of an affiliated health organisation comes from a distinct NSW statutory scheme.7

Calvary challenged the validity of the Health Infrastructure Enabling Act 2023 (ACT), arguing that it authorised the acquisition of property without just terms. The Full Court of the ACT Supreme Court (McCallum CJ, Mossop and Baker JJ) dismissed the validity challenge. In their joint reasons, the judges described s 10(1) as ‘a source of actual obligation rather than a statement of aspiration not giving rise to any legal right’. The Territory’s obligation to provide just terms was therefore enforceable. The judgment concerned the validity of the statutory scheme, rather than whether a particular compensation offer was adequate. Under s 10(2), compensation extended to Calvary’s interest in the public hospital land and the hospital assets acquired. It also covered consequential losses, including the loss of its network agreements with the Territory and any redundancy payments arising from the acquisition. The Court upheld the Act but left the challenge to the regulations unresolved.8 The amount of compensation was resolved later, through a settlement announced in September 2025.

The acquisition also prompted public concern about freedom of conscience in faith-based healthcare. That concern resurfaced in the NSW abortion reform debate in 2025.

A year after the Canberra takeover, Dr Elaine Pretorius said that North Canberra Hospital was providing termination of pregnancy care on the same basis as Canberra Hospital. Abortion and VAD reform are often argued about at the point at which Parliament decides what the law will permit or require. The proposed acquisitions have brought that debate to service delivery, where it had always been expected to lead. Calvary puts its Code into effect through ordinary decisions such as which procedures can be booked in its operating theatres. Those decisions affect patients who have already organised their care around the services available.

As legislation changes the terms on which patients can obtain lawful care — as abortion is decriminalised, as VAD is legalised — other parts of the legislative framework can remain sclerotic, impeding the expanded access those reforms contemplate. A version of that problem was demonstrated in Carr v Attorney-General (Cth). There, the Federal Court held that Commonwealth offences concerning suicide-related communications applied to certain communications authorised by Victoria’s VAD legislation, rendering the state law inoperative to the extent of the inconsistency.9

The proposed acquisitions in the Hunter expose a different limitation. NSW legislation permits these forms of care, and imposes particular obligations concerning their provision, but does not necessarily prevent an incoming private hospital operator from narrowing the services available in a region. There is, then, a case for revisiting the instruments that govern hospital transfers, so that the expansion of lawful healthcare is accompanied by protections for patients who already depend on its provision. They could require the parties to identify services they propose to withdraw before public submissions close and to show, before the transfer takes effect, how they will provide for patients whose care is already underway.

  1. New South Wales, Legislative Council, Notice Paper (17 November 2026) 134–5 (item 3875). ↩︎
  2. New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 12 November 2026 (Amanda Cohn and Courtney Houssos). ↩︎
  3. Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Calvary – Holmesglen Private Hospital (Phase 1 Determination, 28 April 2026) [1]. ↩︎
  4. Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Donum Vitae (Instruction, 22 February 1987) pts I(4)–(5), II(B)(5), (7)–(8); Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Dignitas Personae (Instruction, 8 September 2008) [12]–[16], [19]. ↩︎
  5. Kondis v State Transport Authority (1984) 154 CLR 672, 684–7 (Mason J). ↩︎
  6. Ellis v Wallsend District Hospital (1989) 17 NSWLR 553, 604F (Samuels JA, Meagher JA agreeing), discussed in Elliott v Bickerstaff [1999] NSWCA 453, [90]–[93]. ↩︎
  7. Health Infrastructure Enabling Act 2023 (ACT) ss 8–10; ACT Health Directorate, Annual Report 2023–24 (Report, 2024) ‘Creation of North Canberra Hospital and Transition from Calvary Services’. ↩︎
  8. Calvary Health Care ACT Ltd v Australian Capital Territory [2023] ACTSCFC 1, [5]–[6], [54], [59], [126]–[128] (McCallum CJ, Mossop and Baker JJ). ↩︎
  9. Carr v Attorney-General (Cth) [2023] FCA 1500, [73]–[78] (Abraham J). ↩︎

About the author

Christopher Rudge

Lecturer, Sydney Law School; Deputy Director, Sydney Health Law

Christopher teaches Torts, Mental Illness: Law and Policy and Information Rights in Health Care. Christopher’s research takes place at the intersection of law, psychiatry and biomedicine.

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